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The States enjoy no power with respect to the classification of aliens 
This power is 'committed to the political branches of the 
Federal Government.' Although it is 'a routine and normally 
legitimate part ' of the business of the Federal Government to 
classify on the basis of alien status, .. . and to 'take into account 
the character of the relationship between the alien and this 
country, ' . .. only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by 
a State. I 
I. .INTRODUCTION 
Many states-particularly those with large immigrant popula-
tions---view themselves as indentured hosts to undocumented aliens 
residing in this country as guests of the federal government. Over the 
past few years, states have raised growing concerns that the federal 
government has not met its obligations when establishing and adminis-
tering policy regarding undocumented aliens---concerns based on facts 
and figures such as the $500,000-a-day rate of increase for undocument-
ed alien health care expenses under the California state-funded Medi-Cal 
program.2 Putting such dramatic statistics aside, one sees that the 
deeper thrust of the states' concern is that our federal system has failed 
to protect them from unjust cost allocation in the area of immigration. 
What is less apparent from the states' allegations is that the federal 
government has left other victims in the wake of its failure. In 
particular, the political process has created a backlash against disenfran-
chised groups, such as immigrants, who are the beneficiaries of state and 
federal redistributive programs. 
Recently, state perceptions of low federal accountability and unjust 
cost allocation3 have appeared to catalyze not only anti-immigrant 
1. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1981) (citations omitted). 
2. Liese Klein, Wilson Vows to Defend Proposition, UPI, Nov. 21, 1991, at 13 
(citing California Department of Health and Welfare). 
3. Unjust cost allocation between illegal immigrant and legal resident or citizen, 
and unjust cost allocation between the federal and state governments are two forms of 
redistribution commonly cited in current discussions regarding fiscal responsibility for 
illegal immigration. See, e.g., Keep Heat on President, Congress for Money to Support 
Immigrants , SUN-SENTINEL, May 25 , 1996, at 18A; Pete Wilson, Illegal Immigration 
Hurts America, DES MOINES REGISTER, July 25, 1995, at 11; Jim Specht, Republican 
Task-Force Issues Tough-on-Illegal Immigrants Report, GANNETT NEWS SERVJCE, June 
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sentiment among citizens,4 but also cynicism about the federal govern-
ment as the states' cooperative partner in the federal system. In ratios of 
approximately two to one, the American public believes that the United 
States must curtail levels of immigration and should not provide 
government assistance for those who legally immigrate to the United 
States.5 Initiatives taken in 1994, 1995, and 1996 to restrict alien access 
to welfare benefits and to increase federal fiscal responsibility for 
immigrants marked some of the most significant manifestations of such 
sentiment, calling into question the welfare state 's capacity to absorb 
immigrants. The State of California passed Proposition 187, which 
denies undocumented aliens education and, with the exception of 
emergency medical services, health care benefits.6 Over fifty immigra-
tion bills directed against immigrants, taking measures that range from 
ending all immigration for a period as long as five years to denying 
education to illegal immigrants, have been introduced in Congress. 7 In 
August 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Act, which denies, among other things, food 
stamps and Supplemental Security Income to most legal immigrants.8 
And, most importantly, six states, Arizona, California, Florida, Texas, 
New Jersey, and New York (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
"immigration states" and "plaintiff states") brought suit against the 
federal government, seeking reimbursement for selected costs resulting 
from immigration. If one were to take current public sentiment as 
reflected in legislative proposals, as a proxy for a welfare state's success 
in "absorbing" legal immigrants, the United States would certainly score 
quite low. 
29, 1995; Richard C. Reuben, Law and Politics, The New Federalism, 81 A.B.A. J. 76 
(I 995). 
4. California Senator Diane Feinstein recognized this effect when she stated, "If 
we fail to act, it's only going to continue to escalate ill-will toward all immigrants," in 
reference to an immigration bill she reintroduced in June, 1994 to eliminate AFDC and 
SSI for non-citizens, including legal aliens. Michael Doyle, Feinstein Gets Tougher on 
Immigration, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 16, 1994, at A7. 
5. Frank Wright, Legislative War Waged on Immigrants, Refugees; Foreigners 
Seeking Haven Will Bear Brunt as Congress Pursues Ways to Cut Budget, STAR TRIB., 
June 4, 1995, at 15A. 
6. Nearly sixty percent of California voters ratified Proposition 187. Dan 
Walters, California Voters Join Nationwide Shift to Right, FRESNO BEE, Nov. 10, 1994, 
at A3. 
7. Ellen Debenport, In Divided Congress, Immigration Showdown Looms, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, May 25, 1995, at 12A. Presidential hopeful, Pat Buchanan, rode 
on the anti-immigration wave and called for a moratorium on immigration to the United 
States. Id. 
8. PUB. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-2267 (1996) (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
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A. A Modern Approach to Old Problems: A Paradigm Based on 
Modern Economic Principles of Trust 
The federal government appears to have adopted an agenda to shift the 
risks and the costs of illegal immigration to the states. To what 
implications does this agenda give rise, and how should federal 
policymakers rethink the allocation of respective state-federal duties 
associated with illegal immigration? Arguably, because the federal 
government holds responsibility for inadequately supporting services and 
public benefits for undocumented aliens, it also holds ultimate responsi-
bility for creating the current animosity against legal and illegal 
immigrants alike. This contention runs counter to popular thinking that 
advocates the broad exercise of federal plenary power--thinking based 
largely on the belief that the national government is a better guardian of 
individual rights than the state governments. 
Does such a state of affairs reflect the way things should be? 
Unfortunately, the federalism principles articulated by the framers and 
contained in the Constitution provide little guidance in constructing a 
modem, intelligible theory of federalism to be applied to immigration 
policy. Even if this were not the case, the task would likely be 
formidable because issues of federal-state power relations have 
metamorphosed to a point where the framers would find the current state 
of federalism a faded vestige of their original conception.9 Consequent-
ly, any framework for analyzing how the federalism structure affects the 
ability of the United States to absorb immigrants successfully must focus 
on and extrapolate from the shared concerns and understandings 
underlying the constitutionally-protected, dual-tier system of American 
government. 
This Article takes such an approach and concludes that the notion of 
trusteeship was central to the federal government's relationship with the 
state governments. 10 State demands for federal reimbursement of state 
9. In the context of immigration policy, for example, there exist elaborate 
covenants between the federal and state governments, including grants-in-aid for services 
for undocumented aliens who reside in this country as a result of "the default of the 
political branches of the Federal Government." Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 n. l 
(1982) (Burger, J., dissenting). 
10. See infra parts V, VI. It is interesting to note that early analyses of 
immigration policy and immigrant rights have often invoked the idea of 'contracting.' 
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costs for immigration can be reconceptualized, in part, as ex post facto 
challenges to the federal government's failure to meet a duty assumed 
under an implicit trust that binds the states to their citizens and binds the 
federal government to the states and the national citizenry. Given this 
framework, the search for intelligible principles to guide judges and 
policymakers must look beyond historical analysis to private law theories 
of trusts, contracts, and remedies. 
This Article goes further to argue that the status quo of intergovern-
mental fiscal relations in matters of illegal immigration contravenes the 
principles of the original trust relationship established between the 
federal and state governments by the Constitution. Applying principles 
of the private law of trusts and drawing from the jurisprudence of federal 
trusteeship duties to subordinate, sovereign regimes, such as the Native 
American tribes, this Article strives to develop guiding principles for 
future federal policymaking and remedial action. As a first step, this 
Article methodologically rethinks the constitutional principles on which 
the Supreme Court has relied when reviewing the constitutionality of 
federal action claimed to preclude a state's ability to participate viably 
in our federal system of government. As such, it does not focus on how 
federalism should be structured, but instead, focuses on what responsibil-
ity the federal government has to the states affected by the exercise of 
federal power. The overarching aim is to give modern, pragmatic 
substance to the federal government's affirmative duty to protect the 
states from fiscal subversion-a duty which originates in the federalism 
principles articulated by the framers and contained in the Constitution. 11 
B. Layout of the Article 
The goal of this Article is to develop a framework for analyzing 
claims such as those brought by the immigration states against the 
federal government. In this pursuit, part II of the Article will focus on 
However, in contrast to this Article, which addresses this problem in terms of trusts 
between the states and the federal government, they addressed the problem as based on 
a contract between the alien and the United States. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The 
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. I (1984). 
Since under the classical order the alien's entry was conceived of as a privilege 
whose continued enjoyment was conditional upon her compliance with the 
formal terms that the government prescribed, deportation was simply the 
revocation of her license, a reversion to the status quo ante. No procedural 
safeguards for this reversion where thought to be necessary. 
Id. at 27. 
11. See Janice C. Griffith et al. , Judicial Review a/Federalism Issues in the Third 
Century of the Constitution-A Dialogue, in FEDERALISM: THE SIDFTING BALANCE 77-90 
(Janice C. Griffith ed., 1989) [hereinafter FEDERALISM] . 
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the question of federal plenary power over immigration matters and 
restrictions on state alienage classifications limiting immigrants' access 
to the welfare state. Part III will examine the central claims of the 
immigration states against the federal government. Here, the examina-
tion will concentrate on the state lawsuits seeking federal reimbursement 
for the costs of services for illegal immigrants. Next, part IV of the 
Article examines the constitutional underpinnings of federal duties to 
states. It will focus on the ideas of John Locke and the notions held by 
the Founders, examining the importance and centrality of the federal 
system to the Constitution. Part V puts forth the trust model for 
federalism and outlines the contours of the dual-trust paradigm. The 
next section examines the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment 
as sources of the federal trustee duty. Finally, the Article looks to 
instructive forerunners which provide examples of the courts' treatment 
of governmental trusts. Specifically, it addresses trusts over coastal 
waters, Indian trusts, and trusts with associated states. The Article 
argues that the courts should draw from jurisprudence in these other 
areas of governmental trust when umpiring state claims for reimburse-
ment of costs imposed by illegal immigration. 
II. IMMIGRATION POLICY: A TALE OF FEDERALISM GONE A WRY 
Look to any of the central United States Supreme Court cases or law 
journal articles regarding state alienage classifications or public benefits 
for undocumented aliens, and you will probably come across common 
constitutional buzzwords describing the sharing of power between the 
federal and state governments: Federalism, intergovernmental relations, 
supremacy, preemption, etc. Like other areas of policy which rely 
heavily on the successful symbiosis of federal promulgation and state 
implementation, immigration policy has become plagued with questions 
regarding the locus of governmental control and accountabili-
ty--questions of federalism. Traditionally, the courts have regarded 
questions of federalism as inappropriate for judicial resolution, and more 
appropriate for resolution through the political process. But such an 
approach may not be suitable for a number of matters touching on 
alienage and federalism, because it not only presupposes that the status 
quo is the creation of popular will, but also fails to recognize that the 
political process may be incapable of providing a remedy. 
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Recently, the judiciary once again showed its reluctance to intervene 
in state-federal struggles----this time in very high-profile cases regarding 
immigration matters. A number of federal judges dismissed lawsuits 
brought by California, Florida, and Texas which sought reimbursement 
of the costs of providing for undocumented immigrants.12 More 
significantly, the Supreme Court refused to hear Florida's appeal. 13 
The lawsuits had alleged that the federal government was encroaching 
upon state sovereignty by forcing the states to divert state revenues away 
from state programs to respond to problems created by illegal immigra-
tion.14 
The states' battle for reimbursement was uphill from the beginning. 
First, the states failed to find a remedy through the political process. 
Second, the states' resort to the legal system faced a number of difficult 
obstacles that served as signs of unlikely victory: The federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity, an attempt to use the Tenth Amendment as 
a sword,15 and the difficulty of asking the courts to decide an inherently 
political question. 
12. U.S. District Judge Edward B. Davis dismissed Florida's suit on December 20, 
1994 stating, "The court recognizes that the state of Florida is suffering under a 
tremendous financial burden due to the methods in which the federal government has 
chosen to enforce the immigration laws. . . . But recognizing these facts does not create 
a legal theory under which this court may grant relief. Without such a legal theory, this 
court must dismiss this action." Reena Shah Stamets, Chiles' Suit Against U.S. Tossed 
Out, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 21 , 1994, at IA. On December 14, 1994, U.S. 
District Judge Filemon Vela gave the state of Texas additional time to file briefs in its 
case against the federal government, but indicated that he was effectively dismissing the 
suit. Christy Hoppe, Judge Rejects Role in Suit on Immigration, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Dec. 15, 1994, at IA. On February 13, 1995, U.S. District Judge Judith Keep 
dismissed California's lawsuit to cover the expenses of providing services to illegal 
immigrants. Tony Perry, State 's Immigration Suit Against U.S. Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 1994, at A3; see also Nancy Cleeland, State 's Suit Over I/legal Immigrants 
Dismissed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 14, 1995, at Al 
Id. 
Reading from a lengthy prepared text and citing case law, U.S. District Court 
Judge Judith Keep rejected each of the state's eight claims. Several times she 
said the question of reimbursement should be decided by Congress or the 
executive branch, and pointed out the federal government is immune from 
lawsuits seeking monetary damages. 
13. Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094 (I Ith Cir. 1995), cert. denied, I I 6 S. Ct. 
1674 (1996). The original complaint was filed in Florida in April of 1994. See infra 
note 73. 
14. See, Heather Ann Hope, Who Gets the Bil/for I/legal Immigrants? In the End, 
Supreme Court May Decide, BOND BUYER, Sept. 9, 1994, at I . 
15. For example, prior to any of the dismissals, constitutional scholars commenting 
on the lawsuits showed great skepticism about states' cause of actions based on the 
Tenth Amendment. One Scholar, Jonathan Varat, a professor at UCLA School of Law 
stated, "They're trying to use the Tenth Amendment as a sword, not as a shield, and that 
would be pretty far-fetched. It's a pretty aggressive use of it, which is okay, but it 
doesn't even work that often as a shield." Id. 
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The significance of the state lawsuits is certainly not a function of 
their justiciability. That is, the cases are not "baseless" as the Depart-
ment of Justice would have one believe. 16 The lawsuits may not have 
a recognized cause of action, but the issues they raise call into question 
the basic structural foundation of the American system of governance. 
Moreover, they reveal a general deficiency in the jurisprudence of 
federalism, highlighting the unwillingness of courts to protect and foster 
structural arrangements of governance vital for a fair game of federal-
ism.17 
The legal field tends to discount non-justiciable questions, which are 
usually the most challenging, troubling, and difficult for our institutions 
to address. If the judiciary refuses to involve itself in the dispute, the 
question of voluntary political remedy remains open. If the states' 
remaining appeals ultimately fail, the question of the federal govern-
ment's duty to the states will not die with them. The issues promise to 
continue to challenge state and federal governments far into the future 
until a satisfactory resolution is achieved. Thus, the question of 
intergovernmental relations in matters of illegal immigration deserves 
attention from the legal community-if not to find law-based solutions, 
then to consider political ones. 
A. The Balance of Powers: The Court has Stacked the Weights in 
the Federal Government's Favor 
The federal government enjoys a preeminent role in regulating 
domestic matters pertaining to aliens. In fact, it enjoys a freedom to 
take actions against immigrants-legal as well as illegal--that would 
likely be held inimical to principles of equal protection if applied to 
citizens, such as racial minorities. 18 In contrast, state assertions of 
16. See id. 
17. See FEDERALISM, supra note 11, at viii (noting that one school of thought 
"visualize[s] the Court as the guardian of a sphere of state and local autonomy from 
federal control, a role in some respects similar to the one that the Court has assumed in 
protecting individual liberties"). 
18. In the oft-cited case of Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976), the Court 
upheld a classification of aliens that was based on duration of residence and residency 
status. Congress had erected the classification for purposes of classifying individuals 
ineligible for Medicare Part B. Id. at 69-70. Political flexibility, judicial manageability, 
and limited resources (traditional legal arguments for Court deference to Congress in 
immigration matters) were extended as arguments for deference in the alien benefits 
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power over immigration and alienage classifications are regarded by the 
courts as highly suspect, requiring review under a strict scrutiny 
standard. 19 Naturally, the question of federal plenary power over 
immigration matters has raised many questions regarding the appropriate 
state role in making policies affecting immigrants within their borders. 
The federal government possesses virtually absolute power over 
policies concerning both immigration and immigrants.20 The Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Constitution to grant the federal government 
plenary authority over immigration matters, including terms and 
conditions for residence in the United States, as well as conditions for 
admission to and exclusion from the country.21 And it has gone so far 
area: 
[T]he fact that Congress has provided some welfare benefits for citizens does 
not require it to provide like benefits for all aliens. Neither the overnight 
visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat, 
nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to a 
share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own 
citizens and some of its guests. 
Id. at 80. 
19. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The Court 
reasoned that a 
State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It 
may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public 
assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may not 
accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its 
citizens . . . . The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise 
invidious classification. 
Id. at 374-75 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)); see also Toll v. 
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1,30 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the Graham Court 
as inferring "a congressional purpose not ' to impose any burden or restriction on aliens 
who become indigent after their entry into the United States" '). But see, Tom Gerety, 
Children in the Labyrinth: The Complexities of Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 379, 
393 (1983) (noting that, "[i]n less than a decade [after Graham] exceptions made for a 
variety of public offices-including teachers and probation officers-{had] swallowed 
up this newfound rule of suspicion"). 
20. Peter Schuck explains the expansive federal power to classify aliens as follows: 
[T]he explanation can be found in the classical tradition's self-consciously 
political definition of national community and in its norm of extraordinary 
judicial deference to that choice. By the very nature of this definition, citizens 
and aliens are almost never "similarly situated," while the federal government's 
interests in emphasizing that difference--for example, giving preference to 
citizens in order to encourage aliens to naturalize and thus join the national 
community-is almost always deemed compelling. 
Schuck, supra note I 0, at 24. 
21. See Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens From Discriminatory 
Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 315-317 (1977). 
Rosberg distinguishes between the federal government's control over "an immigration 
rule that operates as a condition subsequent and one that operates as a condition 
precedent" to actual immigration. Id. at 332. He argues that the Court, in cases such 
as Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), bas failed to draw proper distinctions between 
immigration matters, for which the government may legitimately impose burdens upon 
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as to say, "[ o ]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of 
Congress more complete . . . :m 
The Court has found federal authority to control and regulate 
immigration to emanate from a number of constitutional provisions, 
including the power granted to establish a uniform rule of Immigration 
and Naturalization,23 international commerce power, and authority over 
foreign affairs.24 The concomitant constitutional restrictions on federal 
immigration powers, such as the "uniformity" requirement for immigra-
tion and naturalization, have for the most part been reduced to "merely 
hortatory."25 Also tied to the notion of Congress's plenary immigration 
power is the concept of sovereignty. According to the Court, regulation 
of immigration, in so far as it signifies control of borders, not only 
stands as an important symbol of the American polity's exercise of 
autonomy against intrusion, but also symbolizes a vital component of 
national security.26 
Matthews v. Diaz summed up the Supreme Court's position that 
federal plenary power mediates in favor of judicial abstention from 
review of federal actions affecting immigrants: 
For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the 
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been 
aliens, and nonirnmigration matters, for which invidious classifications carry the risk "of 
impermissible injury to aliens" and threaten the country's historically embedded premise 
that immigrants are full members of the American community. Id at 337. 
22. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). For a general discussion of 
congressional use of preemption power, see FEDERALISM, supra note 11, at vii. 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Peter Schuck notes that the implicit, as opposed 
to textual, nature of the broad federal power inferred from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Clause has raised difficulties in determining the appropriate relationship 
between the federal government's power to classify and other constitutional guarantees 
placing restraints on government action. Shuck, supra note I 0, at 24. 
24. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3; see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,318 (1936); Diaz, 426 U.S. 
at 81 n.17; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (I 952)). The foreign affairs 
justification for federal control over immigration includes concerns regarding "political 
flexibility" in foreign affairs------a concern the court believes is not equally shared by the 
states. See, e.g., Diaz, 426 U.S. at 83. 
25. Gerety, supra note 19, at 38 I. The Court noted that "Congress might disregard 
the constitutional policy of uniformity with impunity: uneven or inconsistent legislation 
is hardly an unknown quantity in immigration." Id. at 380-81. 
26. See John W. Guendelsberger, Equal Protection and Resident Alien Access to 
Public Benefits in France and the United States, 67 TuL. L. REV. 669, 677-78 (1993), 
for more discussion on the reasons the Supreme Court has deferred to Congress in the 
alien benefits area. 
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committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions 
in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a 
wide variety of classifications must be defined in the light of changing political 
and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more 
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary .... 
Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility of the political 
branches of government to respond to changing world conditions should be 
adopted only with the greatest caution. The reasons that preclude judicial 
review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of 
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration and 
naturalization. 27 
That such precedent promises to compel the Supreme Court's future 
deference to federal authority over immigration and immigrant matters 
is underscored by the Court's earlier admission that the preponderance 
of legal precedent obliged the court to continue to give great deference 
to the federal government with respect to immigration matters.28 This 
license of virtually unbounded federal control over matters affecting 
immigrants has been used with little regard to questions of fiscal 
accountability to states. 
B. A Higher Standard of Scrutiny for State Alienage Classifications 
As a means of dealing with costs incurred because of illegal immigra-
tion--without demanding reimbursement from the federal govem-
ment---states have attempted to restrict alien access to state public 
welfare benefits. Such attempts have been largely unsuccessful.29 The 
Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to state alienage classifications that 
27. 426 U.S. at 81-82. The Diaz Court cites Harisiades , 342 U.S. at 588-89, for 
authority on the Federal Government 's plenary power over immigration matters: 
[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with 
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war 
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such 
matters are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as 
to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. 
Id. at 81 n. 17. Whereas Diaz presented a due process question concerning an alienage 
classification for the Medicare supplemental medical insurance program, Harisiades 
presented a due process question concerning the retroactive application of a statute that 
established Communist Party membership as a ground for deportation. In this instance, 
Diaz serves to illustrate the indistinct lines that the Court draws between immigration 
and immigrant issues. See Rosberg, supra note 21, for a discussion of the distinction 
between alien immigration (condition subsequent immigration rules) and alien benefits 
(condition precedent immigration rules). 
28. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954). 
29. See Graham v. Richardson, 430 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971); see also Peter H. 
Schuck, The Great Immigration Debate, AM. PROSPECT at 113, Fall 1990 {"Traditionally, 
immigration policy was designed to enhance the sovereign autonomy of the United 
States at the expense of all other values, and the courts interpreted the Constitution 
accordingly."). 
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disparately impact aliens, and rejects the state justification of resource 
preservation.30 The Court has also viewed discriminatory classifications 
as affecting the naturalization incentive, a federal power upon which the 
states have no business infringing: "Control over immigration and 
naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a 
State has no power to interfere."31 Thus, apart from the "political 
function" exception, which enables states to determine the qualifications 
of their most important governmental officials, states possess very 
limited power to take actions against aliens.32 
To reconcile federal alienage classifications with those created by 
states, the Supreme Court has often found state alienage classifications 
invalid under the Supremacy Clause on the ground that they have been 
preempted by national law. The doctrine of preemption recognizes 
Congress' constitutional power to exclude the states from regulating a 
given area.33 Among other things, states may not enact laws or 
30. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (I 982). The Court specifically stated that "a 
concern for the preservation of resources standing alone can hardly justify the 
classification used in allocating those resources." Id. 
31. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10 (1977) (holding that a New York statutory 
provision that bars resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
32. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also Toll v. Moreno, 458 
U.S. 10, 13 n.17 (1982) (the Toll Court clarified that its "cases do recognize ... that a 
State, in the course of defining its political community, may, in appropriate circumstanc-
es, limit the participation of noncitizens in the States' political and governmental 
functions" (citing Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982)); Gerald Rosberg, 
Discrimination Against the "Nonresident" Alien, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 399, 400 (1983) 
("The 'political exception ' may eventually swallow up the entire proposition that 
alienage classifications are suspect . . . and it is plainly the strongest argument a state 
can offer in defending a statue that disadvantages aliens."). 
33. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE SILENT REVOLUTION 
3 ( I 991 ). A significant variation of formal federal preemption is informal preemption. 
In contrast to formal preemption which is initiated by the exercise of preemptive powers 
by Congress, informal preemption occurs when state and local governments apply for 
and accept conditional grants-in-aid. Id. at 35. Grants-in-aid effectively provide the 
national government control over States' expenditures. Some commentators have 
observed that informal preemption has affected the roles of the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of federal government as well as the state governments, local 
governments, interest groups, and citizens. For example, the Domestic Policy Council, 
Working Group on Federalism, concluded: 
[T]he net result of the massive increase in conditional funding . . . has been 
to give the national government power to oversee the States' compliance with 
a wide range of conditional grants, and thus to direct state policy in areas of 
traditional state concern. ... The carrot of federal funding has often induced 
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regulations that are inconsistent with federal law regarding either 
immigration or immigrants. And preemption goes so far as to prohibit 
states from imposing any type of burden not sanctioned by Congress in 
admitting aliens to the United States. In light of federal plenary power 
over immigration matters, virtually all state laws and regulations that 
touch on immigration are highly susceptible to judicial invalidation on 
preemption grounds. 
The Supreme Court case of Toll v. Moreno34 provides an illustration 
of preemption analysis applied to classifications harming aliens. In Toll, 
the Supreme Court considered whether a policy of the University of 
Maryland, a state-operated university that denied in-state status and 
derivative preferential treatment for tuition and fees to resident aliens 
holding G-4 visas, violated the Supremacy Clause.35 The Court held 
that the University's policy was invalid under the Supremacy Clause, 
stating, "[State] regulation not congressionally sanctioned that discrimi-
nates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible if 
it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress."36 The 
Court regarded Maryland's policy in this case to be a frustration of 
federal treaties, statutes, and international agreements giving G-4 aliens 
special tax exemptions.37 Furthermore, the Court found that Congress 
had explicitly decided not to disallow G-4 aliens from acquiring 
domicile. 38 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted: "[T]he Court suggests 
in dicta that any state law which discriminates against lawfully admitted 
aliens is void, presumably without regard to the strength of the State's 
justification, if Congress did not contemplate such a law."39 
Of course, as the Court noted in Toll as well as in the earlier case of 
De Canas v. Bica,40 the federal government can empower the states to 
States to take steps that they might otherwise forego or actively resist. 
Joseph Lesser, The Course of Federalism in America: An Historical Overview in 
FEDERALISM, supra note 11, at 11 (quoting DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, WORKING 
GROUP ON FEDERALISM, THE STATUS OF FEDERALISM IN AMERICA (1986)). Notably, 
just as state governments may appear to "voluntarily" apply for conditional grants-in-aid, 
they may appear to "voluntarily" institute programs and expend funds on behalf of 
illegal immigrants. 
34. 458 U.S. I (1982). 
35. Id. at 3. 
36. Id. at 12. 
37. Id. at I. 
38. Id. at 14. 
39. Id. at 28 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
40. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). In De Canas, the Court addressed whether a California 
statute making it illegal to employ illegal aliens in some circumstances was invalid under 
the Supremacy Clause. The Court upheld the state statute, reasoning that Congress had 
intended to allow states, "to the extent consistent with federal law, [to] regulate the 
employment of illegal aliens." Id. at 361. 
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enact legislation that arguably discriminates against aliens if it is 
consistent with federal law. For example, the enactment of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act did not negate consistent state 
regulations pertaining to aliens, even if those regulations were discrimi-
natory.41 Generally, silence or apathy on the part of the federal 
government is not, however, sufficient to authorize state policies 
discriminating against aliens because it would open up the possibility for 
state usurpation of federal plenary power. The federal government must 
have shown some intention to allow such state action, which would then 
be consistent with federal law.42 For example, in Plyler v. Doe,43 the 
Court held that a Texas statute denying funding for the public education 
of undocumented alien children and permitting local districts to refuse 
admission of such children to schools was invalid under the Equal 
Protection Clause. The Court noted that no existing federal policy 
supported Texas' decision to deny elementary education.44 Plyler is 
also significant, in so far as the state classification applied to undocu-
mented aliens, who, unlike the legal immigrants discriminated against in 
Toll and Graham, were not lawfully admitted under conditions imposed 
by Congress.45 
Yet even in Plyler, the Justices recognized the federal government's 
responsibility to be fiscally accountable for the immigration costs that 
41. Toll, 458 U.S. at 27 (citing 424 U.S. at 358). 
42. Gerety, supra note 19, at 385. 
43. 457 U.S. 202,226 (1 981). 
44. Id. at 225-26. 
As we recognized in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the States do 
have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such 
action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal. In De 
Canas, the State's program reflected Congress' intention to bar from 
employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of permission to work 
in this country. . . . In contrast, there is no indication that the disability 
imposed [here] corresponds to any identifiable congressional policy. The State 
does not claim that the conservation of state educational resources was ever 
a congressional concern in restricting immigration. 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78 (concluding 
that state restrictions on welfare benefits for resident aliens on the basis of alienage 
violated not only the Equal Protection Clause, but also constituted an "encroachment" 
on federal power over lawfully admitted aliens). Interestingly, the Department of Justice 
had indicated in its brief that the federal government had decided it had no interest in 
the issue. Gerety, supra note 19, at 396. 
45. See Plyer, 457 U.S. at 225-26. 
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are concentrated in a handful of states.46 Like the analysis in Plyler, 
the discussion presented here is not intended to question the propriety of 
locating control over immigration and immigrant policy with the federal 
government. Nor is it intended to question Supreme Court jurisprudence 
regarding state alienage classifications and other immigration matters. 
Rather, this discussion is simply highlighting the fact that states' hands 
are tied when it comes to responding to costs imposed by illegal 
immigrants. Surely, invidious discrimination by state governments 
against immigrants, both legal and illegal, is inimical to the United 
States' well-established commitment to immigration and immigrants, and 
should be subject to close scrutiny by the courts. But even though 
immigration matters may be best controlled by the federal government, 
the question remains as to whether federal fiscal unaccountability for 
illegal immigration has created failures in our system of governance that 
the federal government has a duty to remedy. Notably, reimbursement, 
one of the most obvious remedies consistent with the United States' 
commitment to immigrants, does not conflict with federal plenary power 
over immigration and does not require a shift in control over immigra-
tion matters.47 
III. PROMETHEUS UNBOUND: FEDERAL ABDICATION 
RUNNING AMUCK? 
One of the significant consequences of federal plenary power over 
immigrant benefits and services is the concomitant decrease in the states' 
power to respond to state-specific economic and social issues raised by 
immigrant populations. The fact that the locus of power to regulate 
immigration, as well as immigrant policy, resides with the federal 
government has opened opportunities for risk and cost shifting, 
precipitating the breakdown of the United States' ability to absorb 
immigrants successfully. 
Take one current example. A number of federal welfare reform 
proposals, introduced by Republicans as well as Democrats, have aimed 
to eliminate, with few exceptions, immigrant eligibility for AFDC, SSI, 
46. Id. at 240-241 (Powell, J., concurring) ("So long as the ease of entry remains 
inviting, and the power to deport is exercised infrequently by the Federal Government, 
the additional expense of admitting these children to public schools might fairly be 
shared by the Federal and State governments."). 
47. Reirnbursment does not implicate the concern voiced by Justice Blackmun who 
joined the majority decision of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 
(1976), with the understanding that it embraced a balancing approach to state and federal 
power, and did not prohibit the federal government from acting in areas where the 
federal interest was clearly predominant and where state compliance with federal 
standards would be critical. 
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Food Stamps, or Medicaid. The Administration's own proposal seeks 
to extend deeming requirements for federal programs such as SSI, Food 
Stamps, and AFDC. From a state perspective, such proposals may 
effectively shift costs to states which are powerless to respond. 
Specifically, the effects on one state are described by State Senator 
James J. Lack (R-NY): 
The con game would work like this: Congress withholds federal assistance 
from noncitizens, including legal immigrants and refugees, on a broad range of 
programs: food stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and others. The State of New York and our 
cities and counties will immediately become responsible for more than $1 
billion in additional social-service costs . . . . We, the [State and local] 
taxpayers ... will have to pick up the entire federal tab.48 
Lack's observation is particularly troubling when one considers that most 
revenues from immigrants flow to the federal treasury, but most costs 
are incurred at the local level.49 
As Lack has recognized, despite the fact that most revenues from 
immigrants flow to the federal treasury, the federal government has the 
power to force states to absorb immigrant-related costs. Studies suggest 
that, overall, immigrants contribute more in taxes than they use in 
services.50 Whether immigrants impose net costs or generate a net 
surplus in public revenue varies by level of government. At the federal 
level, immigrants generate a net surplus in revenue.51 The result varies 
at the state level, where immigrants may generate either a net surplus cir 
net cost.52 At the local level, immigrants generate net costs, primarily 
in the form of costs for educating immigrant children.53 Simple 
standards of fairness suggest that the federal government should 
redistribute its net revenue suplus generated from immigrants to states 
and localities that experience a net loss through no fault of their own. 
48. James. J. Lack, Playing Switcheroo with Welfare, NEWSDA Y, May 26, 1994, 
at A 7. Contrary to Lack's claim, the degree of cost shifting is unlikely to be 100% and 
will depend upon the structure of individual state' s welfare programs. 
49. MICHAEL FIX & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, IMMIGRATION 






A. State Legalization Impact Assistance Grants (SL/AG) 
In the immigrant context, what has been the states' experience with 
Congress imposing costs and mandates without providing the money to 
pay for them? Have the states been relegated to interest group status?54 
As previously discussed, state initiatives to respond to immigration 
issues are often unsuccessful because they are found to be inconsistent 
with and preempted by federal legislation.55 Because preemptive 
federal legislation delimits states' ability to act on their own behalves, 
preemptive statutes that are unwanted by the states may be viewed as 
intrusive and even subversive of state governance. According to Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, protection against such 
fate lies in "procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal 
system [rather than] judicially created limitations on federal power."56 
The state lawsuits seeking reimbursement for immigration costs bring 
to light Congressional promulgation of legislation disparately impacting 
select states. Here, structural safeguards, such as the representation of 
state interests through representatives in Congress, proved insufficient to 
protect against the failure of the federal government to follow through 
with funds and administrative activity originally promised by and 
attached to federal immigration legislation. States' experiences with 
undocumented alien medical assistance requirements under the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 198657 and with State Legalization Impact 
Assistance Grants (SLIAG)58 for alien residents legalized under the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) are examples of federal 
legislation highly instructive on the practical politics of federalism-at 
least in the immigration context. 
Medicaid requirements for state medical services to undocumented 
aliens illustrate the shifting of immigration costs from the federal to the 
state governments. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 
amended the Social Security Act to require states to provide medical 
assistance to undocumented immigrants not permanently residing in the 
United States under color of law (PRUCOL). Specifically, the Omnibus 
54. See Robert W. Gage, Key Issues in Intergovernmental Relations in the Post-
Reagan Era: Implications for Change, 20 AM. REV. FOR PUB. ADMIN. 155 (1990). 
55. See discussion supra part II.A. 
56. 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985). The Court stated: "[T]he principal means chosen 
by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure 
of the Federal Government itself." Id. at 550. 
57. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1969 (1986) (codified as scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). 
58. 8 U.S.C, § 1255a. 
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Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 amended Medicaid to expand state 
eligibility to include Medicaid payments made for the treatment of an 
emergency medical condition of an undocumented alien who did not 
qualify as PRUCOL.59 
The Medicaid program is a state-administered program that provides 
medical services to individuals in need.60 The program is jointly 
funded by federal and state governments. States must have a federally 
approved state plan to receive federal reimbursement assistance for 
program costs. Because the federal government has not provided full 
funding for emergency medical services provided to undocumented 
aliens, states have been forced to absorb much of the cost. 
Like the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, the passage of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 and the 
Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program increased states' fiscal 
responsibility to provide for immigrants. When Congress passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, one of the key 
provisions was a legalization program for immigrants who had been 
living illegally in the United States.61 Similarly, under the SAW 
program, undocumented aliens who established that they had worked at 
least 90 days in the United States seasonal agriculture industry received 
temporary, and subsequently permanent, legal status.62 The great 
majority of immigrants legalized under IRCA were barred from federal 
benefits for five years, whereas immigrants legalized under SAW were 
barred from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and some 
select medical benefits for five years.63 
The question naturally arose as to who would pay for the government 
services provided for these individuals and their families once they 
ceased hiding and began using public hospitals, schools, and other 
facilities. It was clear at the time that the legislation would impose 
disproportionate social service costs on states such as California. 
Officials for cities and counties with large immigrant populations 
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2). 
60. 42 u.s.c. § 1396 (1994). 
61. The other key provision established sanctions to prevent employers from hiring 
illegal immigrants. CRS REP. FOR CONG, STATE LEGALIZATION IMPACT ASSISTANCE 
GRANT (SLIAG) PROGRAM F'UNDING: FACTS AND ISSUES, 93-592 EPW at CRS-1 (June 




successfully argued that, since immigration is a federal responsibility, 
Congress should help them defray costs for the medical, welfare, and 
educational costs64 of serving newly legalized residents.65 Conse-
quently, section 204 of IRCA, titled State Legalization Impact Assistance 
Grants (SLIAG), allotted $1 billion a year for four years (FY 1988-1991) 
to reimburse state and local governments. IRCA provided that SLIAG 
funds were to be used to reimburse states and localities for public 
assistance, public health services, and educational services for eligible 
legalized aliens. The funds were to be used as well for public outreach 
and education to inform temporary residents about the process of 
adjusting to permanent resident status and to inform the public about 
employment discrimination. 66 
The federal government only partly kept its promise. In 1989, Senate 
and Administrative officials "raided" SLIAG funds to pay for drug 
programs and health research, but promised to restore the money at a 
future date. They justified the action as a use of surplus SLIAG 
funds .67 In 1990 and 1991, the Bush Administration cut a total of 
$1.12 billion of SLIAG funds , but failed to replace the funds in the 1992 
appropriations.68 The funds were then deferred to 1993, but only 
64. These costs include subsidized housing and literacy education. Associated 
Press, Panel OKs Funds for Immigrants, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Oct. 2, 1992, at A3. 
65. More than half ( 1.6 million) of the 3 million immigrants who applied for 
amnesty under IRCA were residents of California. Jennifer Toth, Congress OKs Big Cut 
in Immigrant Aid Funds , L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1990, at A2I. 
66. CRS REP. FOR CONG., supra note 61, at CRS-2. 
67. Roybal: Only Part of a Very Long Tradition , L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at B6 
[hereinafter Roybal]; see also CRS REP. FOR CONG., supra note 61, at CRS-3 (for a 
breakdown of SLIAG funding history). 
68. Roybal, supra note 67, at B6; Mary Benanti, Group Decries States · Lack of 
Amnesty Funds, GANNET NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 24, 1991. The San Diego Union Tribune 
described SLlAG as "a slush fund for politicians' pet projects," explaining that "Rep. 
Dan Rostenkowski, D-111. , and White House budget director Richard Darrnan conspired 
to raid SLIAG funds to finance expansion of the business school at Chicago's Loyola 
University, Rostenkowski 's alma matter." The Cost of Immigration, SAN DLEGO UNION 
TRIB., Nov. 27, 1991 , at B8. Some federal officials described the cuts as affecting only 
surplus SLIAG funds. Jane Mason of the American Public Welfare Association 
responded to this argument, stating: " In reality, there is a lag time between when the 
states incur the costs and when they ask the federal government for reimbursement .... 
[T]he fiscal situation is so tight on labor and health and human services subcommittees 
that SLIAG competes with AIDS funding, education funding, mental health, energy 
assistance." Mary Benanti, Group Decries States · Lack of Amnesty Funds, GANNET 
EWS SERVICE, Sept. 24, 1994. Another commentator described "surplus" funds as 
fo llows: 
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The so-called surplus in SLIAG existed because the funds accumulated while 
the federal government has been slow in reimbursing local governments and 
not because there is no demand for the money. For instance, Los Angeles 
county, with the largest number of immigration amnesty applicants of any 
local jurisdiction in the nation, has asked for $230 million from the federal 
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$325,672,000 of the $1.12 billion was actually appropriated, with 
approximately $800 million deferred until 1994.69 Thus, through the 
end of the 1993 federal fiscal year, only $2. 7 billion of the original $4 
billion authorized and appropriated to SLIAG had actually been allotted 
to the states. 70 
The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act and the 
authorization for SLIAG funds have the trappings of a funded mandate, 
but have many of the qualities of an unfunded mandate. Together with 
the amended Medicaid requirements under the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, IRCA represents an affirmative measure by the 
federal government to enfranchise individuals who had either overstayed 
legal visas or had illegally entered this country despite federal border 
control policies in which states play almost no role. Yet, as recognized 
by the SLIAG grant scheme, these federal actions had potentially 
significant implications for states with large immigrant populations, such 
as California. 
B. State Lawsuits for Federal Reimbursement: Demands for Change 
States affected by high levels of immigration have responded to the 
federal government's actions and nonfeasance in the immigration arena. 
They have raised their voices against federal commandeering using a 
number of means, the most visible and potentially powerful of which are 
lawsuits seeking reimbursement of costs. Although a majority of the 
states' lawsuits seeking reimbursement ( or, in the altemati ve, an 
injunction) for costs associated with undocumented aliens have been 
dismissed at the initial stage, review of the lawsuits is highly useful 
because they provide a summary of the rights the states believe they 
possess and the obligations the states believe the federal government 
owes with respect to illegal immigration. 
The plaintiff states' complaints evolved in a climate of growing 
demands on state officials to find a solution to a fiscal sclerosis believed 
government in the current fiscal year and gotten only $28 million back so far. 
San Diego County is seeking a more modest $2 million, but bas received only 
$300,000. 
Stealing from Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, I 989, Part II, at 6. 
69. CRS REP. FOR CONG., supra note 61 , at CRS-3. 
70. Id. at CRS-4. 
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to result from illegal immigration,71 and as such, reflect political 
exigencies72 and paint a picture of an immigration invasion73-with 
rising numbers of undocumented aliens growing out of control and 
placing intolerable burdens on the states' polities.74 Certainly the states 
skewed the picture in their favor,75 but the question remains: Do the 
principles that animate the federal system demand that the federal 
government reimburse the plaintiff states? The discussion of the 
complaints below concentrates on select suits brought by Florida, 
California, and Arizona, as these capture the main legal issues before the 
courts. 
1. Overview of the States' Lawsuits 
In 1994, the states of Arizona, California, Florida, as well as Texas, 
New Jersey, and New York,76 brought separate suits against the federal 
government to seek reimbursement of the cost of providing federally 
mandated public services, such as emergency medical services and 
AFDC, for undocumented immigrants. Some also sought reimbursement 
for the cost of incarcerating undocumented aliens. 77 The plaintiff states 
tried to convince the courts that their claims go to the heart of the 
United States federalist system---------<:asting serious, compelling doubt upon 
71. Overall, illegal immigrants appear to represent a net cost to the economy. FIX 
& PASSEL, supra note 49, at 70. 
72. Immigration is a central issue in state political campaigns this election year and 
state legislators have introduced proposals to limit state services for immigrants. See, 
e.g., Gregory & Luis Wilmot, Referendum is a Poor Way to Govern, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, March 10, 1996, at 6J; Dan Morain, Assembly Panel Fails to OK State Budget, 
L.A. TIMES, June I, 1995, at A3; Julia Preston, U.S. Rebuts U.N. Critics of Human 
Rights Record, WASH. POST, March 30, 1995, at Al 9; David LaGesse, Discontent Grows 
Toward Immigrants; Florida May Duplicate California Measure, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 
8, 1995, at 4A. 
73. See Florida Complaint at 14, Chiles v. United States, (S.D. Fla.) (No. 94-0676-
CIV) (filed April 11, 1994) [hereinafter Florida Complaint]. 
74. See e.g., id. at 3, 6. 
75. For example, the Florida Complaint states that "the Federal Government is 
exclusively and directly responsible for the uncontrolled influx of aliens to Florida .... " 
Id. at 4. This statement is inaccurate. States have often created incentives for illegal 
immigration. For instance, many employers in the plaintiff states benefit from hiring 
immigrants and have formed strong lobbies to protect their interests, at the same time 
creating strong economic incentives for illegal immigration. See, e.g, Latinos Divide 
Over Immigration, CA. J. WKLY., Sept. 6, 1996. 
76. Arizona, California, and Florida are, hereinafter, collectively referred to as the 
"plaintiff states." 
77. Florida seeks reimbursement only as an alternative to "an injunction directing 
the defendants to cease the policies that have subjected plaintiffs to an invasion of aliens 
and commandeered their legislative processes to meet the resulting costs .... " Florida 
Complaint, supra note 73, at 36. 
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the ability of the national political process to protect state sovereignty.78 
Abuse of power easily emerges as the powerful, overarching theme of 
the claims and implicates Constitutional provisions, including the Tenth 
Amendment, the Guarantee Clause,79 and Article I, Section 8, Clause 
180 of the of the United States Constitution, as well as the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. The plaintiff states argue that 
because the Supreme Court's established jurisprudence, regarding equal 
protection restrictions on state alienage classifications, has left them 
relatively powerless to target alien benefits, the federal government has 
been able to fetter them by imposing incompletely funded mandates and 
by forcing them to absorb the unavoidable costs81 of maintaining the 
state citizenry's well-being in the face of illegal immigration. 
Overall, the complaints paint a picture that absolves the plaintiff states 
by depicting the federal government as not only failing in its duty to 
78. See e.g., California Complaint at 6, Wilson v. United States, (S.D. Cal.) (No. 
940674K(CM)) (filed April 29, 1994) [hereinafter California Complaint One]. 
At issue is ... whether the federal government may force state governments 
to implement federal policies through the disbursement of state generated tax 
funds, turning the Constitution of the United States into a suicide pact for 
states like California by abrogating the promise of federalism established and 
promoted by that document. 
Id. at 2; see also , Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 25. 
The national political process has provided no adequate safeguard against this 
discrimination. The costs imposed by the continuing influx of aliens on state 
and local governments are disproportionately concentrated in only a few states, 
including Florida. Representatives of other states have a political incentive to 
ignore such costs, or to provide only small and thus far ineffective tokens of 
assistance, rather than ensure that they are borne equitably. 
Id. at 25-26. 
79. The Guarantee Clause provides, in pertinent part: "The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall 
protect each of them against Invasion .. . . " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
80. The United States Constitution, provides, in pertinent pan: "The Congress 
shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States ... . " 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. 
Id. 
81 . See Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 20. 
[E]ven if no legal obligation exists, as a practical matter plaintiffs have no 
choice but to expend state and local government funds to support, educate, 
house, care for, feed, supervise, and incarcerate many aliens who enter the 
State as a result of the Federal Abdication and Default Policy, or else suffer 
injury to its sovereign interests through increased crime, disease, illness, 
homelessness, and the many problems presented by an uneducated or poorly 
educated populace. 
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prevent the entry of undocumented aliens into the United States, but also 
adopting policies that encourage the influx of undocumented aliens into 
their respective states.82 Specifically, the complaints allege that the 
federal government has constructively repudiated its fiscal responsibility 
and rendered itself fiscally unaccountable for illegal immigration in a 
number of ways: 1) By refusing to pay the full costs of alien benefits, 
2) by failing to allocate total federal funds appropriated for partial alien 
program funding, and 3) by delegating broad power over disbursement 
of appropriated funds to administrative agencies. Failure to achieve 
resolution of these claims through the political process has forced the 
states to seek judicial remedy. I will address the central, non-duplicative 
counts of Florida's, California's, and Arizona's complaints. 
2. Seeking to be Made Whole: Florida '.s Claims Against the 
Federal Government 
The state of Florida estimates that in fiscal year 1993 it spent 
approximately $2.5 billion in state and local funds to provide services to 
aliens.83 Of the $2.5 billion, $884 million (a little over one third) was 
estimated to flow to undocumented aliens.84 Citing the fact that the 
federal government not only has plenary power over immigration 
matters, but also receives an estimated two-thirds of aliens' tax 
dollars,85 Florida contends that its "forced" outlay of funds on behalf 
of aliens is "repugnant to constitutional norms of equality and fair-
ness. "86 
Florida's claim contains four separate counts against the United States: 
1) Failure to develop regulations governing disbursement of the 
Immigration Emergency funds, 2) failure to enforce and effectively 
administer immigration laws, 3) unconstitutionality of program 
restrictions, and 4) violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Guarantee 
Clause and the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
82. See id. at 13. Given the concentration of immigrants within a few states, 
immigration has become an increasingly localized issue. As such, one might choose to 
distinguish between immigration "into respective states" and immigration into the United 
States. 
83. Id. at 20. 
84. Id. The complaint provided a breakdown of the costs, in an attached exhibit: 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, OFFICE OF PLANNING & BUDGETING, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS POLICY UNIT AND FLORIDA ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE UNFAIR BURDEN: IMMIGRATION'S IMPACT ON 
FLORIDA, i, iii (March 1994). 
85. Hearings Before the U.S. House Subcomm. on Human Resources (1993) 
(testimony of Charles Wheeler of the National Immigration Law Center). 
86. Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 6. 
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Florida argues that judicial relief for counts one and three is warranted 
by existing law and that judicial relief for counts two and four follows 
logically from the Supreme Court's decisions in Bowen v. Massachusetts 
and New York v. United States.87 
a. Count I : Failure to Develop Regulations Governing Disbursement 
of the Immigration Emergency Funds 
Florida raises the issue that the Attorney General has failed to develop 
the regulations necessary to disburse the "Immigration Emergency Fund" 
and asks the court to review the administrative action, issue an 
injunction to the Attorney General that directs her to "comply with her 
duties under 8 U.S.C. § 1101 ;88 ..• develop a plan . .. for disbursement 
of the Immigration Emergency Fund; [ and] grant to Florida its just share 
of funds."89 As described by Florida, the "Immigration Emergency 
Fund" was authorized by section 113 of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act. Section 113 amended 8 U.S .C. § 1101 to authorize an 
annual appropriation sufficient to maintain a balance of $35 million in 
funds (the "Immigration Emergency Fund") to be disbursed to state and 
local governments incurring costs during a presidentially declared 
immigration emergency.90 Although the federal government has never 
87. Bowen, 487 U.S. 879 (1988); New York, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Florida 
Complaint, supra note 73, at 7. Florida also places general reliance on the dicta in the 
majority and dissenting opinions in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Plyler held that 
a Texas law which withheld funding for illegal alien children and allowed districts to 
deny enrollment for these children violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 230. The complaint does not focus on Plyler' s reasoning, but does 
focus on the fact that five Supreme Court Justices in Plyler agreed that the federal 
government should bear the cost of providing education to illegal alien children. Florida 
Complaint, supra note 73 , at 7. The complaint quotes Chief Justice Burger's Plyler 
dissent,in which three other Justices joined: 
It does not follow ... that a state should bear the costs of educating children 
whose illegal presence in this country results from the default of the political 
branches of the Federal Governrnent. A state bas no power to prevent 
unlawful immigration, and no power to deport illegal aliens . . .. If the 
Federal Governrnent, properly chargeable with deporting illegal aliens, fails to 
do so, it should bear the burden of their presence here. 
Id. (citing Ply ler, 457 U.S. at 242 n.l) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The complaint also 
cites Justice Powell as stating "the Federal Governrnent should bear financial 
responsibility for its actions." Id. (citing 457 U.S. at 241 (Powell, J. concurring)). 
88. ("[A]s amended by Pub. L. 99-603, Pub. L. 101-649 and Pub. L. 102-140"). 
89. Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 27. 
90. Id. at 24. 
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formally declared an immigration emergency,91 a further amendment to 
8 U.S.C. §1101, adopted in 1990, grants the Attorney General discretion 
to disburse up to $20 million a year from the $35 million annual fund 
without the President's declaration of an immigration emergency.92 
Furthermore, other amendments to 8 U.S.C. § 1101 require the Attorney 
General to promulgate regulations to describe the situations that would 
qualify as immigration emergencies, and to set the standards and process 
for reimbursing states for costs incurred as a result of such an emergen-
cy.93 
Notwithstanding the Attorney General's failure to delineate the criteria 
for an immigration emergency, Florida insists that an "immigration 
emergency," as defined by Public Law 99-603, has existed continuously 
since at least 1986.94 Florida further argues that by failing to establish 
the conditions that would constitute an immigration emergency and 
failing to develop the regulations that would enable disbursement of 
Immigration Emergency Funds, the Attorney General has precluded 
reimbursement of states in violation of the 1990 and 1991 amend-
ments.95 Thus, Florida alleged that, despite the authorization of the 
initial appropriation of $35 million in 1986, the federal government had 
saved almost $280 million by not disbursing any of the funds to Florida 
or any other state.96 
b. Count 2: Failure to Enforce and Effectively 
Administer Immigration Laws 
The second count focuses on costs Florida has been forced to absorb 
in order to preserve the public health and safety of the state. Florida 
argues that the federal government has refused to accept financial 
responsibility for the failure of the INS Commissioner, the Attorney 
general, the INS Acting Regional Director, and the INS District Director 
to enforce and administer immigration laws effectively. Florida 
describes this failure in enforcement and administration as an abuse of 
discretion and "at best an arbitrary, capricious, and irrational Federal 
Abdication and Default Policy" that has imposed fiscal and political 
91. Id. at 26. 
92. Id. at 24 (citing the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §705, 104 
Stat. 5087). 
93. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 102-140, Title VI, §610, 105 Stat. 832 (1991)). 
94. Id. at 26. 
95. Id. at 27 ("As much as $60 million could have been available to the states .. . 
over the last three years."). 
96. Id. at 24. 
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responsibility for immigration on states like Florida. The impact on such 
states disadvantages them relative to the other states: 
Florida and its political subdivisions have effectively been required to pay a 
grossly disproportionate share of the costs of a national problem as compared 
to almost all other states, resulting in a studied inequality among the states 
contrary to a fundamental premise of the United States Constitution.97 
Florida claims it has no choice but to pay the costs of certain services 
for undocumented aliens who were able to enter the state because the 
federal government failed to enforce immigration laws.98 
c. Count 3: Unconstitutionality of Program Restrictions 
Florida currently participates in two state-federal "cooperative 
programs" which serve persons in need, including some illegal as well 
as legal aliens: 
(a) Medicaid99- as provided for under 42 U.S.C. § 1396b 
and implemented under 42 C.F.R. § 435.406; and 
(b) Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
("AFDC"}--as provided for under 42 U.S.C. §602 and 
implemented under 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.50, 233.51 , and 
233.52. 
Under the arrangement, Florida must contribute some state funds in 
order to obtain a certain level of federal funding. 100 However, the state 
cannot be reimbursed for the costs of providing services to aliens who 
fall outside the restrictions of the Medicaid and AFDC statutes and 
regulations.101 
Florida claims that it should not be disqualified from receiving federal 
funds for the amount it must spend on behalf of needy "ineligible" 
aliens, because such disqualification penalizes Florida for having an alien 
population. Consequently, Florida holds the position that the current 
restrictions on federal funding for Medicaid and AFDC for certain 
97. Id. at 29. 
98. Id. at 28 (" If [Florida does] not provide such services, the State will suffer 
injury through increased crime, disease, illness, homelessness, and the many problems 
presented by an uneducated or poorly educated populace."). 
99. The Medicaid program's purpose is to allow states to provide medical services 
to individuals in need. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396. 
I 00. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2). 
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33). 
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classes of aliens have no logical, rational, or constitutional basis. 102 
Florida argues that the cooperative program provisions and regulations 
have also enabled the United States and the HHS Secretary to comman-
deer the legislative process of Florida and its subdivisions and to punish 
the state for conditions created by the federal government. 103 
The remedy to this problem, Florida insists, is for the federal 
government to provide Medicaid and AFDC funding on the same basis 
other states are assisted: Need. 104 Eligibility-but-for-alien-status 
standards for federal cooperative program funding discriminate against 
states like Florida for having a disproportionately large population of 
aliens, in that the federal government reimburses other states for nearly 
all of their expenditures for need-based medical care and AFDC.105 In 
light of the circumstances described, Florida requests that the Court 
declare the AFDC and Medicaid restrictions on alien coverage either 
contrary to the cited statutes (in the case of regulations only) or 
unconstitutional. 
3. California s Complaint Regarding Medicaid for 
Undocumented Aliens 
California brought three separate suits to recover the costs of illegal 
immigration. They respectively seek: a) Reimbursement of approxi-
mately $400 million in annual emergency health care costs of undocu-
mented aliens, 106 b) reimbursement for the incarceration costs for 
undocumented immigrants, and c) reimbursement of the cost of 
educating undocumented immigrant children. In its action regarding 
Medicaid, California challenges provisions amending the Social Security 
Act that require the state to expend money from its general fund to 
implement federal policy to provide emergency health care to undocu-
mented aliens. California must pay fifty percent of the costs of such 
health care from its general funds.107 
I 02. Florida Complaint, supra note 73, at 31. 
I 03. Id. at 32. 
104. Id. at 31. 
105. Id. 
I 06. The complaint states that in fiscal year 1988-1989, the first year of 
implementation, federal law mandated that California provide emergency medical 
services to approximately 31,600 OBRA 86 aliens at a cost of $21 .1 million. California 
asserts that because the number ofOBRA 86 aliens has "risen dramatically", the number 
of OBRA 86 aliens for whom it was required to provide medical services rose to 
299,900 (at a cost of $337.5 million to the State General Fund). California Complaint 
at 9, Wilson v. United Sates, (C.D. Cal.) (No. 94-3561LBG) (filed May 31, 1994) 
[hereinafter California Complaint Two] . 
107. Id. at 2. 
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a. California Challenges Federal Requirements for State Funding of 
Emergency Medical Services 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 amended the Social 
Security Act to require states to provide medical assistance to undocu-
mented immigrants not permanently residing in the United States under 
color of law. 108 Specifically, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1986 amended Medicaid to expand state eligibility for select Medicaid 
benefits to undocumented aliens (the complaint refers to such aliens as 
"OBRA 86 Aliens"). 109 The Medicaid Program is a state-administered 
program, jointly funded by federal and state governments. 110 States 
must have a federally approved state plan to receive federal reimburse-
ment assistance for program costs. 111 The Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act of 1986 was enacted in conjunction with the Immigration 
Reform Control Act of 1986 (IRCA 86), which combined employer 
sanctions with broad amnesty for undocumented aliens, in an effort to 
"dramatically reduce the flow of undocumented aliens into the United 
States."112 California argues that the changes made by these pieces of 
legislation have failed to meet their goal of reducing the flow of 
undocumented aliens into the United States, but instead, have resulted 
108. Id. 
109. Id. The complaint cites regulations implementing OBRA 86 which are set 
forth in 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.406(c) and 440.255{c). "The Administrator is charged by law 
and delegation to implement and apply the provisions of 42 C.F.R. §§435.406(c) and 
440.255(c) to the State of California and its State Medicaid Plan." Id. at 7-9. 
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(2). 
111. If California failed to provide emergency health care to OBRA 86 aliens, 
federal financial participation in the approved medical assistance plan would cease. 
California Complaint Two, supra note 106, at 12-13 (citing 42 U.S.C. §1396). 
In 1988, the State of California enacted legislation, including Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 14007.5 (Senate Bill 175, Stats. 1988, ch. 1441), to 
authorize the State Medi-Cal Program to provide emergency health care to 
OBRA 86 Aliens, as required by federal law, and such provisions, as 
amended (Senate Bill 485, Stats. 1992, ch. 722) were in full force and effect 
at all times relevant to the allegations set forth in this complaint. The 
definition of emergency health care, as required by federal law was included 
in Welfare and Institutions Code section 14007.5 as enacted by Senate Bill 
175, and as amended by Senate Bill 485. References in this complaint to 'SB 
175' are to chapter 1441 of the Statutes of 1988, as originally enacted and 
amended by chapter 722 of the Statutes for the State of California. 
Id. at 9. 
112. Id. at 8. 
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in substantially higher levels of illegal immigration. As a result, 
federally mandated Medicaid coverage for qualified undocumented aliens 
that was partly based on the expected success of !RCA sanctions will 
cost the California State General Fund an estimated $1,760,971,224 by 
the end of state fiscal year 1994-95.113 Because the federal govern-
ment has not provided full funding for emergency medical services 
provided to undocumented aliens, California has been forced to absorb 
much of the cost of an imperfect federal immigration policy. 
b. Finding Authorization for Reimbursement 
California brings two separate claims-one pursuant to Public Law 
103-112 and the other pursuant to Public Law 103-121. According to 
the complaint, both Public Law 103-112 and Public Law l 03-121 entitle 
California to full reimbursement of the amount it has spent to provide 
emergency medical services to OBRA 86 aliens. 
i. Claim Pursuant to Public Law 103-112 
As described by the complaint, Public Law 103-112 appropriated 
funds to the Department of Health and Human Services for the 1994 
federal fiscal year and portions of the federal fiscal year 1995 to support 
federal financing of the Medicaid Program.114 California contends that 
Public Law 103-112 appropriates funds to reimburse California for 100 
percent of the cost of providing emergency medical services to OBRA 
86 aliens, and has requested the Secretary of HHS (hereinafter "Secre-
tary") and Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration 
113. Id. at 10. 
114. Id. at 15 (quoting Public L. No. 103-112, 107 Stat. 1982, 1905 (1993): 
784 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
in Congress assembled, that the following sums are appropriated out of any 
money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated for the Departments of . .. 
Health and Human Services ... for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, 
and for other purposes, namely: . .. 
Health Care Financing Administration 
GRANTS TO STATES FOR MEDICAID 
For carrying out, except as otherwise provided, titles XI and XIX of the 
Social Security Act, $64,477,413,000, to remain available until expended. 
For making, after May 31, 1994, payments to States under title XIX of the 
Social Security Act of the last quarter of fiscal year 1994 for unanticipated 
costs, incurred for the current fiscal year, such sums as may be necessary. 
For making payments to States under title XIX of the Social Security Act 
for the first quarter of fiscal year 1995, $26,600,000,000 to remain available 
until expended.). 
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(hereinafter "Administrator") make such funds available. 115 In con-
trast, the Secretary and Administrator (as described by the complaint) 
interpret Public Law 103-112 as not affecting reimbursement for OBRA 
86, which they believe is limited to the federal medical assistance 
percentage dictated by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (a)(8)(B). 116 
California claims that if 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) and 42 U.S.C. §1396(d), 
which describe the OBRA 86 costs for which California may be 
reimbursed, and 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (a)(8)(B), which provides for 
determination of the federal medical assistance percentage, are construed 
by the United States or any of the named defendants to prevent 
reimbursement of California's total costs for providing emergency 
medical services, such provisions and actions violate provisions of 
Article IV, Section 4 and the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. 117 
Furthermore, the complaint argues that the failure of the Attorney 
General, the Commissioner of INS, the Director of 0MB, the Secretary, 
and the Administrator to reimburse California for its total costs 
constitutes an abuse of discretion granted them by the President and 
Congress to implement immigration laws and disburse funds appropriat-
ed in that regard. 118 
ii. Claim Pursuant to Public Law 103-121 
California's second claim is very similar to its first in that it argues 
that a federal Appropriation Act, Public Law 103-121, includes 
authorization to the Attorney General to disburse funds for the purpose 
of reimbursing states, such as California, for their full costs of providing 
emergency care to OBRA 86 aliens. 119 Public Law 103-121 provides 
an appropriation of $1,048,538,000 from the Treasury to the Attorney 
115. Id. at 16 ("Appropriations to the Department [of Health and Human Services] 
in the amounts set forth above include authorization to the Secretary to expend funds for 
reimbursement to the State of California for those costs described in 42 U .S.C. § 1396b 
and § I 396d, as set forth above."). 
116. Id. at 17 ("On December 20, 1993, the Secretary, acting pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
[§] 130I(a) (8) (B), promulgated the federal medical assistance percentage applicable to 
the California State Plan for medical assistance, for the 1994-95 Federal Fiscal Year, to 
be 50 percent of the total amount expended by the State of California as medical 
assistance under the State Plan. 58 Fed. Reg. 66863 (1993)."). 
117. Id. 
I 18. Id. at 20. 
I 19. Id. at 22 (explaining that these are the costs of implementing federal 
immigration policy as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)). 
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General for expenses "necessary for the administration and enforcement 
of laws relating to immigration, naturalization and alien registration" 
during federal fiscal year ending September 30, 1994.120 The Attorney 
General disputes California's claim, refusing to reimburse California on 
the grounds that 103-121 provides no authorization for reimbursement 
of states' costs for emergency medical care of OBRA 86 aliens. 121 
Failure by the federal government to provide full reimbursement of 
OBRA 86 alien medical assistance costs has, as described by the 
complaint, harmed California in a number of ways. First, California has 
been forced to pay an increasingly disproportionate cost to implement 
federal immigration policy. Second, California was forced to forego 
spending for other purposes. 122 This outcome resulted because 
California's constitution prohibits deficit budgeting, thereby limiting the 
amount of funds that may be appropriated by the State Legislature and 
local legislative bodies, and limiting the amount of particular taxes that 
may be raised. 123 Because California has not received relief through 
the political process, the complaint seeks relief in the form of: 1) A 
judgment declaring that California has the right to reimbursement of 100 
percent of its expenditures for emergency medical services for OBRA 86 
aliens (made pursuant to 42 U.S .C. § 1396b(v)) from appropriations 
made to the Attorney General and Secretary of HHS by Public Law 103-
121; 2) an injunction requiring the Attorney General, Secretary of HHS, 
and Director of 0MB to make such a disbursement; and 3) a judgment 
that any federal law that prevents the reimbursement of California's costs 
120. Id. at 21-22. 
121. /d.at22. 
122. Id. at 18. 
123. Id. at 18-19. The complaint describes the federal government's demands on 
California general funds as impinging on California's ability to exercise its sovereignty: 
In California, the budget is the single most important policy document 
undertaken by government . . . . The United States has, by failing to 
reimburse the State of California the full cost of providing emergency health 
care to OBRA 86 Aliens, and by enacting other laws or implementing other 
policies claimed by it to limit the right of the State of California to such 
reimbursement, required that State taxes be raised, that State funds be 
expended, that State statutes be enacted and implemented-all to further the 
interests of the United States and the immigration policies adopted by it. By 
its immigration policy and the requirement to provide emergency health care 
to OBRA 86 Aliens, the United States and defendants have prevented the State 
of California from exercising its sovereign right to expend funds to further the 
polices and interests of its citizens as determined by the people of the State of 
California and their elected representatives, acting pursuant to the California 
Constitution. 
Id. at 19. 
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in question is void and in conflict with Article 4, Section 4 and the 10th 
Amendment of the United States. 124 
4. Reimbursement of Undocumented Alien Incarceration Costs: 
Arizona and California 
a. Incarceration in Arizona 
Arizona invokes the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure 
Act in bringing a claim against the federal government for reimburse-
ment of costs incurred for the imprisonment of undocumented aliens 
convicted of a felony in Arizona. The complaint contends that Arizona 
is entitled to such reimbursement pursuant to the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986, which requires the Attorney General to 
reimburse states for such costs and authorizes the appropriation of funds 
for such reimbursement. 125 The complaint quotes the following 
provisions of the Act: 
(a) Subject to the amounts provided in advance in appropriation Acts, the 
Attorney General shall reimburse a State for costs incurred by the State for the 
imprisonment of any illegal alien or Cuban national who is convicted of a 
felony by such a State. 
(b) There are authorized to be ap~ropriated such sums as are necessary to carry 
out the purposes of this section. 6 
Like the California complaint that seeks reimbursement of emergency 
medical service costs for OBRA 86 aliens, Arizona invokes Public Law 
103-121, which provides an appropriation (in the amount of 
$1,048,538,000) for expenses incurred in administering and enforcing 
immigration, naturalization, and alien registration laws during the fiscal 
year ending September 30, 1994. 127 In addition, the complaint cites 
an amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act which permits 
increased fines and forfeitures for immigration laws to be used to 
124. Id. at 23, 24. 
125. Arizona Complaint at 14, Symington v. United States (D. Az.) (No. 94-0866) 
(filed May 2, 1994) [hereinafter Arizona Complaint] (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a), 100 Stat. 
3443. , Pub. L. 99-603 and 8 U.S.C. § 1365(b)). 
126. Id. (quoting the Immigration and Reform and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § l 365(b) 
(1986)). 
127. Id. at 6 (citing U.S.C., Congressional & Administration News, 103rd Congress, 
1st Session, Public Law 103-121, 07 Stat. 1153, 1160). 
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enhance "the enforcement of the immigration laws, including the 
identification, investigation, and apprehension of criminal aliens." 128 
According to the complaint, incarceration expenditures by Arizona, 
which are not otherwise provided for, are incurred in administering and 
enforcing laws pertaining to immigration, naturalization, and alien 
registration, as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 129 Arizona 
contends that the appropriation under Public Law 103-121, and any 
additional funds made available through 8 U.S.C. ~ 1330, cover 
incarceration costs described by the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a), and therefore, seeks reimbursement pursuant to 
the appropriations.130 Arizona asserts that failure to make such 
appropriations constitutes an abuse by the Attorney General, the 
Commissioner of INS, and the Director of 0MB of discretion granted 
them by the President. 131 
Arizona's State Department of Corrections and the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have estimated that almost 
ten percent (1,760) of Arizona's total inmate population (17,968) met the 
definition of "illegal alien," as provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1365(a), and 
thereby, are subject to deportation. 132 Given an annual incarceration 
cost of approximately $15,773 per inmate, Arizona estimates that it has 
spent approximately $25 million for the incarceration of undocumented 
aliens.133 Also, Arizona has a constitutional provision, similar to that 
of California's, that places a debt limitation on expenditures by the state 
legislature. 134 Limits on deficit spending have forced the Arizona state 
legislature to forego some appropriations on behalf of its legal residents 
because the state tax income goes to incarcerating and paroling 
undocumented aliens. 135 
128. Id. at 7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1330(b), 104 Stat. 5057, Pub. L. 101-649). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 13. 
132. Id. at 9. 
133. Id.at?. 
134. Id. at 11 ( citing ARiz. CONST. art. 9, § 5). 
135. Like the other states, Arizona argues that its failure to find a political remedy 
requires the Court to issue: I) A judgment declaring that Arizona is entitled to 
reimbursement for the cost of incarcerating undocumented aliens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1365(a) "from any appropriation to the Department of Justice for the administration 
and enforcement of laws relating to immigration, naturalization and alien registration, 
including Public Law 103-121, funds made available pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1330, and 
funds appropriated for those purposes by Congress in any subsequent fiscal year"; 2) a 
permanent injunction requiring the Attorney General, INS Commissioner, and the 
Director of 0MB to make such reimbursement pursuant to Arizona; 3) a judgment 
declaring that any law enacted which prevents reimbursement of Arizona's costs for 
incarcerating undocumented aliens is void and in conflict with Article IV, Section 4 and 
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b. California s Complaint for Reimbursement of Undocumented 
Alien Incarceration Costs 
As in the case of Arizona, California's case challenges the federal 
government's failure to reimburse the State of California for the cost of 
incarcerating undocumented immigrants. 136 The claims and relief 
sought on the issue of reimbursement for incarceration costs are nearly 
identical to their counterparts in the Arizona complaint. 137 Probably 
the most interesting aspect of this case is its request for a judgment 
declaring that the Attorney General, the Commissioner of INS, and 
federal employees under their direction have an administrative duty, 
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act, to deport persons convicted of deportable 
offenses (under these Acts) as well as prosecute persons who return to 
California in violation of any deportation order. 138 The complaint 
seeks an injunction mandating the defendants' compliance with such 
duties. Further, it seeks that any law that prevents defendants from 
performing the duties in question be found to violate Article IV, Section 
4 of the Constition and the Tenth Amendment. 139 
According to the complaint, federal law requires that the INS begin 
deportation proceedings "as expeditiously as possible" after the 
conviction of an alien eligible for deportation.14° California contends 
the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; 4) a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the Attorney General, INS Commissioner, and 0MB Director from applying 
any federal law that would prevent reimbursement for the costs of incarcerating 
undocumented aliens. Id. at 16. 
136. In contrast to the Arizona case, incarceration costs include prison construction 
necessary to house alien felons and parole supervision for illegal aliens not deported. 
California Complaint One, supra note 78, at 6. 
137. It bears noting that during California fiscal years spanning between 1991-92 
and 1993-94, California experienced a "financial crisis" and found it necessary to issue 
Revenue Anticipation Warrants and registered warrants to meet the state's financial 
obligations. Id. at 13. 
138. Id. at 5 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1326). 
139. Id. at 4. 
140. Id. at 16. "[I]n the case of an alien who is convicted of an offense which 
makes the alien subject to deportation, the Attorney General shall begin any deportation 
proceeding as expeditiously as possible after the date of conviction." Id. (emphasisis 
added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i)). It appears that Congress intended deportation 
proceedings to begin at the time of conviction, not release. 132 CONG. REC. H9785-0l 
(Oct. 9, 1986). 
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that the intent behind expediting deportation proceedings was to 
minimize the cost that states would have to absorb for incarcerating 
convicted undocumented aliens and to reduce state prison overcrowding. 
As described by the California complaint, INS currently follows a policy 
under which interviews and processing of incarcerated aliens subject to 
deportation are prioritized according to the "most imminent release 
date," notwithstanding the alien's actual date of conviction and 
incarceration. 141 California maintains that the failure of the Commis-
sioner of the INS to implement the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(i) 
constitutes an abuse of her delegated discretion, and requests that the 
Court issue an injunction pursuant to a declaration that under 8 U.S.C. 
1252 (i), which states the defendant has a duty to begin deportation 
proceedings as soon as possible after the date of conviction. 142 
The complaint also raises the claim that the Attorney General and INS 
Commissioner have failed in their duty under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to take 
custody of inmates who are released from confinement and eligible for 
deportation. 143 California argues that failure to take custody is an 
abuse of authority which has imposed security and medical costs on 
California. Accordingly, the state seeks a judgment recognizing 
defendants' custodial duty and an injunction compelling them to comply 
with it. Finally, California brings a claim to require the Attorney 
General to adopt an effective enforcement policy when administering 8 
U.S.C. § 1326, which subjects alien felons re-entering the United States 
to federal imprisonment for a maximum of 2 to 15 years upon convic-
tion. 144 The complaint contends that California has experienced an 
illegal alien inmate return rate of 37%--which California attributes 
largely to the failure of the Attorney General to prosecute under 8 
U.S .C. § 1326 undocumented aliens who illegally re-enter after formal 
deportation. As a remedy, California seeks a judicial declaration that the 
Attorney General has a duty to prosecute under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and a 
duty to expend appropriate funds for this purpose, or in the alternative, 
reimburse California for its actions enforcing federal immigration policy. 
The fifth and final claim seeks a declaration and injunction by the court 
that would establish a mandate that the Attorney General and Commis-
141. California Complaint One, supra note 78, at 17. The complaint also states that 
California officials believes that " INS/Border Patrol agents are not interviewing inmates 
that have six or more months left to serve on their state prison terms." Id. The upshot 
of such a policy is that INS is able to lower or minimize its spending on deportation 
proceedings by shifting the costs, in the form of increased incarceration periods, to 
California. 
142. Id. at 19. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 22-23. 
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sioner execute all final orders of deportation (pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(c)) by removing a deportee to a location in the "country of origin 
most likely not to result in re-entry." 145 
IV. THE POLITICAL REALITY OF COST SHIFTING 
A. Back-Door Mandates: Imposing Costs Indirectly 
On the surface, the states' complaints all appear to implicate federal 
unfunded mandates-costs that were unavoidable, imposed by the federal 
government, and that used funds that would otherwise have gone to 
programs directed at legal residents. However, unlike federal mandates, 
the state money was not spent pursuant to a constitutional, statutory, or 
administrative requirement, nor could it be described as the difference 
between the amount a state government would spend on an activity 
absent a federal mandate and what it is required to spend by the 
mandate. 146 Although there existed no explicit federal directive 
requiring states to provide costly services, the expenditures arguably 
were created by the nonfeasance of the federal government as well as 
state reliance on federal reimbursement for select expenses147 on behalf 
of undocumented immigrants--a form of "back-door" unfunded 
mandating. The states expended the money out of perceived necessity; 
because the federal government failed to handle illegal immigration 
matters successfully and refused to allocate appropriated funds, they 
were left with little choice but to absorb costs for programs and services 
necessary to protect the general state welfare. Given the fiscal impact 
of compounded backdoor mandating of this kind, it is hardly surprising 
145. Id. at 33. 
146. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 152. "Unfunded mandate" has become a 
political catch-term, which the general public applies to everything from grants-in-aid 
to statutorily defined national criteria/standards to any form of national regulation that 
imposes costs on states. See e.g., Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, House Rules Comm. 
Hearing, Unfunded Mandates, Jan. 11, 1995 (testimony of Sen. St. George, Assistant 
Director State Fiscal Project Center on Budget and Policy Priorities). As described by 
Congressman Gary Condit (D-Cal), the U.S. Conference of Mayors reported that "over 
1,000 local officials around the Nation held events in which they singled out unfunded 
Federal mandates as the biggest problem they face." Rep. Paul Gillmor & Fred Eames, 
Reconstruction of Federalism: A Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit Unfunded 
Mandates, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395,397 n.10 (1994) (citing 139 CONG. REC. H8568 
(daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993)). 
147. See supra part III.B.2.a. for a discussion about immigration emergency funds. 
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that the states describe the government as "commandeering" their 
legislative processes. 148 
B. Possibility of Political Remedy 
Another notable feature of the much publicized states' lawsuits is their 
function as a sword in the battle over control and accountability of 
illegal immigration. The suits ostensibly seek judicial remedy, but the 
high probability that the courts would eventually find the cases 
nonjusticiable and dismiss (as they already have for many) suggests that 
the suits may really be a maieutic agent in the struggle for voluntary 
political remedy by the federal government.149 Viewed within the 
framework of an organizational paradigm of federal-state dynamics 
known as the "dialectical" model, 150 seeking increased federal account-
ability through high-profile lawsuits is a logical step to changing the 
federal-state order in the immigration sphere. The dialectical model 
predicts that the opportunity for reform will arise when tensions in the 
inter-organizational, political, and administrative system can no longer 
be suppressed, and that at such time a rival organizational paradigm will 
emerge. 151 Applying the model to the immigration context, does it 
appear that a new organizational paradigm will prevail? If recent 
148. For a discussion of the effects of unfunded mandates on states generally, see 
Gillmor & Eames, supra note 146. 
149. The federal government bas taken some action to respond to concerns 
regarding state costs of immigration. For example, the 1994 Crime Law expedited 
deportation of criminal aliens, expanded categories of crimes for which criminal aliens 
could be deported, and, most importantly, provided a $1.8 billion reimbursement to states 
for the costs of incarcerating illegal criminal aliens. Katharine Q. Seelve, Anti-Crime 
Bill as Political Dispute: President and G.O.P. Define the Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 
1995, at Al6. However, it remains to be seen how much of this $1.8 billion actually 
reaches the states. As far as education and medical services are concerned, President 
Clinton's 1996 budget authorized $100 million for educational assistance for both legal 
and illegal immigrants, and $150 million to subsidize the state costs of providing 
emergency medical care to illegal immigrants. Hearings Before the U.S. H.R. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims (Apr. 5, 1995) (testimony of 
Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel of The Urban Institute). 
150. Arthur Benz, Regionalization and Decentralization, in FEDERALISM AND THE 
ROLE OF THE STATE 127, 130 (Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler eds., 1987) 
[hereinafter ROLE OF THE STA TE]. 
151. Id. at 131. Other theories explaining the impetus of change exist. For 
example, Herman Bakvis and William Chandler predict that "outside forces such as those 
stemming from changes in the international economy may reduce the resources available 
to one or more governmental units or interest groups", which would spur a demand for 
change in the federal-state relationship. Herman Bakvis & William M. Chandler, The 
Future of Federalism, in ROLE OF THE STATE, supra note 150, at 314. They describe 
another source for demands for change as the federal relationship itself, which 
"generate[s] within itself those features that sooner or later will result in alteration of that 
relation." Id. 
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political circumstances are any indicator, it seems it may. 152 But the 
solution will come only after the states have absorbed significant costs. 
Moreover, political solutions may not prevent further metastasizing of 
federal abdication. Such possible outcomes suggest that political 
solutions may be neither a sufficient nor a reliable bulwark against 
failures in the federal system. 
C. Interstate Redistribution: The Economic 
Incentives of Undersupply 
Division of power between the state and federal governments fosters 
efficiency of governance. Efficient distribution of power means that the 
federal government is not only responsible for harmonizing and unifying 
policy regarding foreign and interstate relations-------policies that affect the 
entire country proportionally, but is also responsible for establishing 
programs and providing national public goods such as national de-
fense-goods that would be underproduced if left to the individual 
states. Such goods which are better left under the control of the federal 
government may be termed "national public goods." Likewise, 
production of public goods that affect only one level of society are 
properly left to the more localized governments of the states and cities 
that contain those sectors affected. Such goods may be termed "local 
public goods." 
Allowing state and local governments to provide local public goods 
enables those people who are affected to decide whether program 
benefits exceed the costs. Different communities will then provide 
different combinations of goods that cater to their respective citizen-
ries.153 Theoretically, when the effects of localized goods are concen-
trated within the sphere of the state or local government providing them, 
aggregate utility should be greater than if the national government were 
responsible for providing the goods uniformly throughout the coun-
try.154 Programs and services dealing with illegal immigration and 
152. This effort is already seeing political results. See supra note 149. 
153. Assuming that perfect mobility exists, people will move to those areas that 
provides a mix of goods that best satisfies their demands. See PAUL E. PETERSON ET 
AL. , WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS (1986). 
154. Id. at 11 ("Playgrounds can be concentrated where young children are 
abundant; recreation halls for senior citizens can be clustered in adult communities; parks 
can be maintained at varying levels of care, depending on local aesthetic tastes."). 
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illegal immigrants fall somewhere between pure national public goods 
and pure state public goods. Accordingly, some public expenditures 
targeting illegal immigration and services for illegal immigrants are 
funded by national taxes, while others rely upon state and local 
resources. 
Redistribution of resources necessary to respond to illegal immigration 
will be of a territorial and social variety-entailing the transfer of 
resources among states as well as the transfer of resources from 
American citizens to immigrants who are residing in the United States 
without the consent of the U.S. government. 155 Citizens in states with 
high undocumented immigrant populations may believe that the interest 
in preserving the state's general welfare and meeting basic standards of 
human decency mediate in favor of making available to illegal immi-
grants a minimal level of public services and benefits, such as medical 
assistance. At the same time, individual states that experience high 
levels of illegal immigration may be disinclined to provide services or 
public benefits to illegal immigrants. Immigration states may fear that, 
by redistributing state resources to illegal immigrants, they will increase 
the incentive for illegal immigrants to locate in their states. Further-
more, states with relatively few illegal immigrants would incur both the 
direct and externality benefits of the immigration states' socially 
redistributive policies benefiting illegal immigrants; the direct benefits 
would be the avoidance of costs that might be distributed nationally, and 
the externality benefits would take the form of enhanced national 
welfare. 
155. Because of the importance people may place on citizenship, social redistribu-
tion to non-citizens may be particularly difficult to achieve. See PETER H. SCHUCK & 
ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT 99 (I 985) (arguing that "the 
essence of consensual political identity" is the notion of "us" versus "them," which then 
explains the desire to preserve resources for those who belong to "us."); see also Linda 
S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker 
Under United States Law, WIS. L. REV. 955, 961 (1988). 
Social relations in most communities can be viewed, in abstract terms, as 
being comprised of rules and practices that constitute community membership 
at two distinct, though related, levels. The concern at the first level is with 
who is in and who is out - with determining the subjects of community 
membership. At the second level, the focus is on the nature of the relation-
ships between those people acknowledged to be members - on establishing 
the meaning or substance of the membership. 
Id.; Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV. 
I, 3 (1988) ("Among full members of the community, the ideal of equality prevails; as 
to outsiders, the issue of equality seems irrelevant. Equality and belonging are 
inseparably linked. To define the scope of the ideal of equality in America is to define 
the boundaries of the national community."). 
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Because of the collective action problems raised by the territorial and 
social redistribution of both resources and services, national government 
is in many ways best suited to assume responsibility for providing 
services and goods. 156 Unfortunately, centralized provision of public 
goods and services creates a disjunction between those who make 
decisions as to how to meet national objectives and those who pay the 
bills. This disjunction characterizes much of immigration and immigrant 
policy, as illustrated by the Refugee Act of 1980. In many ways, 
Congress has acceded to the Executive's willingness to admit refugees 
at record levels, while neither branch related refugee flow to overall 
migration levels. 157 Policymakers regarded difficulties as local prob-
lems unconnected to unregulated immigration from Mexico, which itself 
was considered a local problem. A handful of states were thus left with 
increased costs for welfare and social services, a situation that has fueled 
local resentment and fostered continued refugee backlash. 
To the extent that particular benefits of the federal system are 
decentralized, diseconomies arise which promote the undersupply of 
public goods that have interregional spillovers. What one state gains 
through redistribution is perceived as a loss by other states. Thus, the 
federal government operates under the pressure of assuaging states that 
experience (or simply perceive) national encroachments on their power 
and that are angered by actual and anticipated loss of resources. 158 
156. See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 17 (noting that the federal 
government will be best positioned to assume responsibility for redistribution when it 
" takes the form of a cash award based on some fairly well defined criteria," but that 
when "commodities are to be distributed or services are to be performed----housing, 
education, medical care, food, legal assistance, or social services --the administrative 
complexity of the redistributive program may call for participation and cooperation by 
local governments."). 
157. John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 819,855 (1982) (discussing the impact of the Refugee Act of 1980). 
The author makes the related point that immigration issues should sometimes be viewed 
as local. With reference to Texas' refusal to apportion state aid to educate undocument-
ed immigrants, he argues: 
[I]n Texas, regional economic interests have been largely responsible for a 
federal border policy that has consistently encouraged ' back door' migration. 
The benefits of this policy have accrued largely to that state; therefore, it 
seems fair that Texas should bear the reasonable educational costs that are 
incidental to these benefits. 
Id. at 861-62. 
158. See William M. Chandler, Federalism and Political Parties, in ROLE OF THE 
STATE, supra note 150, at 164 (discussing the ability of national political parties to 
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Redistribution of resources from non-immigration to immigration 
states underscores the conflicts of interest among states. Although 
mutuality of states' interests underlies immigration policy, there exists 
a strong incentive for the national government to fund programs and 
services related to illegal immigration below the efficient level. Of 
course, the idea behind redistribution is that, as members of the larger 
nation, states should experience extemality benefits from national 
programs that bring gains to other states. Even so, national 
decisionmakers will undervalue the benefits because they will discount 
the benefit of the extemality by the probability that the states which are 
not directly consuming will actually perceive the externality benefits. 159 
If the problem is viewed as localized and no extemality benefits are 
perceived by other states, or if such benefits are de minimus, the 
undervaluation may be significant. 
V. THE GOVERNMENT AS THE PEOPLE: A TRUST MODEL ANALYSIS 
OF FEDERAL DUTIES 
A. The Complexity of Bringing Order to Federalism 
As discussed earlier, the states' complaints regarding the federal 
government's role in formulating, implementing, and funding policy 
concerning illegal immigration are largely complaints about our system 
of federalism. Appropriately, analysis and evaluation of the states' 
claims should take place from such a perspective. In order to answer the 
question of whether the states have made a claim for which the 
American system of federalism demands remedy, we must first analyze 
the relevant positive rights created on behalf of states under the 
Constitution. Second, we must examine the nature of federal duties 
arising by virtue of such positive rights. Unfortunately, the task is 
formidable. Federalism remains a structural farrago, not readily 
amenable to coherent understanding. The central constitutional 
protections for state rights, the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee 
Clause, lacking as they are in content, have become creatures of 
interpretation. Every stroke of the academic's pencil has left the veneer 
"serve as integrative mechanisms, which through formal and informal ties can prevent 
regional parties from neglecting the interests of those outside their own jurisdiction"). 
159. Distributional coalitions may form as a partial remedy to the mismatch between 
the costs and benefits of public goods. The effect of such coalitions will be a function 
of their interests and relative bargaining power. See Bakvis & Chandler, supra note 151, 
at 313. Bakvis and Chandler describe distributional coalitions as seeking benefits for the 
members at a cost to the larger community. Id. The existence of such coalitions is 
explained by economic self-interest. Id. 
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of federalism riddled with streaks. One commentator captured the 
central problem of scholars' attempts to bring order to federal-state 
dynamics, describing the analysis as "typically a set of imprecise images 
that dramatize the chaos, disorder, and lack of controlled purpose said 
to characterize the current system." 160 Eschewing the classic conun-
drum for workable principles of federalism, as they pertain to fiscal 
responsibilities, requires a morphologic approach to a theory of states' 
positive rights. 
The steady growth of constitutionally sanctioned federal power over 
a veritable bevy of economic and social issues since the time of the New 
Deal brought with it a concomitant shrinkage in state autonomy as well 
as confusion about the meaning of federalism in the United States. 161 
Many critics of federalism, such as William Riker, applauded such 
development as a proper move against "at best . . . a confusion of 
contradictory policies, and at worst as a tyranny by minority and 
'impediment to the freedom of all. "'162 For those such as Riker, who 
view a federally-dominated system of government as more efficient and 
democratic than a state-dominated republic, I ask the question: does the 
dissonance between federal plenary power over immigrants and the state 
provision of welfare and services for immigrants not create substantial 
inefficiencies that deserve correction? If so, how strongly does an 
efficiency argument hold up against challenges? Beyond the normative 
questions, do states' rights embodied in the Constitution carry an 
160. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 217 (citing Thomas J. Anton, intergov-
ernmental Change in the United States: An Assessment of the Literature, in PUBLIC 
SECTOR PERFORMANCE: A CONCEPTUAL TuRNING POINT 22 (Trudi C. Miller ed. , 
1984)). Peterson goes on to quote Anton' s findings on characterizations of American 
federalism: "[T]he federal system has been described as 'out of control, ' 'dangerously 
dysfunctional,' 'a Leviathan run amuck,' 'ungovernable,' largely 'uncontrolled and 
unaccountable,' and suffering from a 'centralization maelstrom."' Id. 
161. ld. at5. 
But because of a series of New Deal Supreme Court decisions that whittled 
away the exclusive powers of the states and gave Congress the authority to act 
in virtually all areas of economic and social life, this doctrine became 
moribund, and the scholarship on federalism became as confused, ad hoc, and 
inchoate as federal policy itself. 
Id. In moving from an analysis of what powers properly belong in the federal and state 
spheres respectively to an analysis of what responsibilities accompany the shift or 
amalgamation of power, we may be able to circumvent some of the conceptual problems 
that have faced the academics described by Peterson. 
162. Thomas 0. Hueglin, Legitimacy, Democracy, and Federalism, in ROLE OF THE 
STATE, supra note 150, at 34. 
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accompanying command to remedy fiscal inefficiencies? I argue that the 
Constitution established a trust relationship between the states and the 
federal government and that the nature of this relationship dictates that 
the federal government be more accountable to the states. Admittedly, 
a damage action may not be a practical remedial dimension of the 
Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment, and may thus call for the 
Supreme Court to render a simple declaration that a particular action of 
the federal government has violated either or both of these clauses. 
B. Duality of Trusts: A Framework for Analysis 
An oft-neglected touchstone of our federal system of government is 
that the federal government is a fiduciary entrusted with confidence and 
owing the highest duty to act in good faith for the benefit of its citizens. 
No concept is more closely associated with fiduciary relationships than 
that of the trust, a type of fiduciary relationship which involves a trustee 
who holds legal title subject to the rights of beneficiaries. 163 The 
fiduciary relationship is created by a party called the settlor, who puts 
her property in the trust. The trustee then manages that property for the 
purpose of benefiting a beneficiary. The most common form of trust, an 
express trust, is created expressly by the settlor and must possess the 
following elements: A trustee who has consented to the relationship, 
property managed by the trustee (res), 164 and beneficiaries who may 
include the trustee or the settlor. The word "trust" need not appear in 
an express trust, as evidence of the settlor's intention to create such a 
relationship suffices. In the case of federalism, evidence of the 
settlement of the governmental trust may be adduced from the history of 
the Constitutional Convention. 
C. Locke s Vision of Government as Trustee 
American federalism, the principle of sharing power between the states 
and federal government, is the product of a constitutional compromise 
between those championing a strong central government and those 
preferring the looser bonds of the confederation. 165 Since the framing 
of the Constitution, the United States has seen a significant evolution in 
both the immigration and federalism issues to which the Constitution is 
163. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, 
AND ESTATES, chs. 1-3 (3d ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). 
164. "Property," for purposes of trust, may consist of anything recognized by the 
law as such. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 74b (1959). 
165. See e.g., Arnold I. Burns, The Perspective of Federalism at the United States 
Department of Justice in 1987, in FEDERALISM, supra note 11, at 45. 
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applied. Historical and political changes notwithstanding, I use induction 
from historical fact to show that our governmental system is one based 
on trust, with certain duties inhering in powers granted and exercised. 
The notion that the formativeJ'rocess of government bears analogy 
to a trust model is not novel.' However, past discussions of the 
government trust have focused on the duties and obligations of the 
federal and state governments to the people and have neglected to use 
the trust framework to analyze the respective rights and obligations that 
arise between the federal and state governments themselves. 167 
Although the theory of government as trustee for the people did not gain 
widespread attention until it was applied by John Locke-undoubtedly 
the most famous advocate of the extended trust metaphor for civil 
governance--the idea was discussed as far back as the early seventeenth 
century. 168 American adoption of the trust doctrine can be traced back 
to the ideas and writings of Locke. Locke bad a large influence on the 
creation of the American government, beginning with the Declaration of 
Independence, when his "impact [was] unmistakable,"169 and continu-
ing through the period of constitutional construction, when his theories 
shaped the federal paradigm. 170 Locke believed that government was 
the product of a contract among people, that legislators were trustees for 
the public good of the people--trustees who could be impeached if they 
breached the trust. 171 For Locke, the formative process of civil 
166. John Locke was one of the earliest advocates of the trust model of 
gonvemance. See Donald L. Doemberg, "We the People ": John Locke, Collective 
Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL. L. REv. 
52, 61 n.50 (1985) (citing J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 156 (2d ed. 
1973)). 
167. See, e.g, J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 154-192 (2d ed. 
1973); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE, 376-381 (P. 
Laslett ed. 1960). 
168. Doemberg, supra note 166, at 61 n. 50. 
169. Id. at 64 (citing E. DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND 
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 20, 42 (1950) and A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 90 ( 1948)). 
170. "Professor G. Mace notes, 'Locke has long been considered the political 
theorist who exerted the greatest influence upon our national-rights heritage . . . . Many 
go so far as to suggest his influence upon the American Funding Fathers was so great 
that the United States may be termed a Lockean nation."' Id. at 58 n.36 (citing G. 
MACE, LOCKE, HOBBES, AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 9 (1979)). 
171. Id. at 64. However, "[s]everal writers suggest that Locke's repeated resort to 
the trust metaphor should not be taken to connote a trust in a literal or formal sense." 
Id. at 62 (citing J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 175-78 (2d ed. 1973) 
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government, where the people served simultaneously as the settlors and 
beneficiaries, underpinned the trust relationship. 172 
D. The Question of Sovereignty: The Founders' Envisionment of 
Federal-State Roles Under the Constitution 
State delegates attending the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
(Convention) faced the formidable task of crafting a new system of 
federal governance. The Convention marked an ideological departure 
from the principles that animated the Articles of Confederation, the 
American people's failed attempt to create a federation of states. Driving 
forces behind the Convention included the delegates' desire to correct 
abusive state behavior engendered under the Articles of Confederation. 
Such state abuses were thought by many to impinge on individual 
rights, 173 and two prevailing bodies of thought, Federalist and 
Antif ederalist, endeavored to find a solution to the problem. 
The Antifederalists feared the loss of control that they believed would 
accompany concentration of power at the national level. 174 As de-
scribed by Gordon Wood: 
[T)he Antifederalists' lack of faith was not in the people themselves, but only 
in the organizations and institutions that presumed to speak for the people ... . 
They were 'localists,' fearful of distant governmental, even representational, 
authority for very significant political and social reasons that in the final 
analysis must be called democratic . . . . The Antifederalists saw themselves 
in 1787-88 fighting the good old Whig cause in defense of the people 's liberties 
against the engrossing power of their rulers. 175 
Like the Whigs, the Antifederalists feared the dichotomy between 
national interests and state interests. Federalists, on the other hand, 
advocated a strong national government. They sought to empower 
national government as a remedy to the failing of the Articles. Some 
Federalists, such as Edmund Randolph, the author of the Virginia plan, 
and J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT SECOND TREATISE 112 (P. Laslett, ed. 
I 960)). 
172. Id. at 61. 
173. For example, Madison argued that "[t]he rights of individuals are infringed by 
many of the state laws---such as issuing paper money, and instituting a mode to 
discharge debts differing from the form of the contract." Akhil Reed Amar, Of 
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1440 n.60 (1987) (citing I THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318-319 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937). 
Amar describes the Federalists view of the Articles of Confederation. Id. at 1440-42. 
174. GoRDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 
521 {1969) (citation omitted). 
175. Id. at 520-21. 
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even wanted to go so far as to create "a strong consolidated union, in 
which the idea of states should be nearly annihilated."176 
The Anti federalists' fear that a strong national government would 
subsume state govemments177 held significant ramifications for the 
Federalists in framing the Constitution, for they knew that if people 
believed the Constitution would eventually destroy the states and 
produce a consolidation, it would never be adopted. 178 
Consequently, in their constitutional debates, both the Federalists and 
Ant if ederalists came to focus on the question of the power to be reserved 
to the states. 179 To respond to the Antifederalists' concern about state 
power, the Federalists posited a number of explanations of how the 
proposed constitutional system would protect against unbridled 
aggrandization of national power at the cost of state independence. 
These explanations covered a broad range. Some emphasized the fact 
that "the new government in many of its provisions was so 'dependent 
on the constitution of the state le~islatures for its existence' that it could 
never 'swallow up its parts. "' 18 Others argued that "each state was 
only 'giving up a portion of its sovereignty' in order 'better to secure the 
remainder of it. "'181 Some felt there were "two governments to which 
[people] . . . owe[d] obedience,"182 while still others argued that "'[t]he 
sphere in which the states moved was of a different nature' from that of 
the federal government."183 The controversy did not end there. Some 
felt that the Constitution was "not completely consolidated, nor [was] it 
176. Id. at 525 (quoting Edmund Randolph's description of his proposed Virginia 
Plan). 
177. Anti federalists argued that the supremacy of federal government would 
'" eventually annihilate the independent sovereignties of the several states."' Id. at 528 
( citation omitted). 
Id. 
178. Id. at 528-29. 
179. Id. at 529. 
I 80. Id. ( citation omitted). 
I 8 I. Id. ( citation omitted). 
182. Id. (citation omitted). 
183. Id. (citation omitted). Wood quotes Edmund Pendleton as arguing that 
[t]he two governments act in different manners, and for different purposes . . . 
the general government in great national concerns, in which we are interested 
in common with other members of the Union; the state legislature in our mere 
local concerns . ... They can no more clash than two parallel lines can meet. 
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entirely federal," 184 and others believed that sovereignty "reside[d] in 
the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government."185 
Ultimately, the argument that supreme sovereignty resided in the 
people and that state governments would be protected as long as the 
sovereign people so deemed won the battle for the Federalists. 
According to this argument, the people "only dispensed such portions of 
power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare" and could 
"delegate it in such proportions, to such bodies, on such terms, and 
under such limitations, as they think proper."186 As the genuine 
sovereign, the people were the source of ultimate, preeminent authority. 
Thus, the people could "take from the subordinate government's powers 
with which they have hitherto trusted them, and place these powers in 
the general government." 187 How the powers were to be distributed 
between the state and federal governments was a choice to be left to the 
people who could "distribute one portion of power to the more 
contracted circle called State governments [and] furnish another 
proportion to the government of the United States."188 Under this 
framework, the state and national governments were to serve the people. 
VI. A PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAME: GOVERNMENT TRUSTEES 
Although the Framers did not expressly describe government as being 
based on a trust model, the formative process of governance under the 
Constitution is infused with the spirit of Lockean trusteeship. The trust 
analogy applies to the relationship between the states and their citizenry 
as well as the relationship between the federal government and the 
people of the nation. Collectively, the states of the union acted as settlor 
of the trust between the people of the nation and the national govern-
ment. At the time of constitutional construction, the states respectively 
served as trustee for the interests of their local citizenry. Both before 
and after the drafting of the constitution the states were vested with 
"numerous and indefinite" police powers over the affairs of state 
citizens. 189 Such powers "extend[ ed] to all the objects which, in the 
ordinary course of affairs, concern[ ed] the lives, liberties, and properties 
of the people and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
184. Id. (quoting James Madison). 
185. Id. at 530 (quoting James Wilson). 
186. Id. (quoting James Wilson). 
187. Id. (quoting James Wilson). 
188. Id. at 530-31 (quoting James Wilson). 
189. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (New American Library, 
1968) [hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 45]; see ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 25. 
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State."190 Yet, such power was not to be used in any manner the state 
chose, but rather, to further the interests of the citizen beneficiaries. 191 
The states owed the highest duty of good faith to their citizens, and this 
explains why, at the time of constitutional construction, concerns about 
preserving state and local interests were foremost on the Founders ' 
minds (see Table 1 on following page). 
The federal and state governments were to assume the responsibilities 
of trustees acting on behalf of the people. As the beneficiaries of the 
trust relationship, the people retained the power to control state and 
national governments directly through elected representatives and 
indirectly through the threat of revocation or alteration of delegated 
power. 192 And in the capacity of trustee, the state and federal govern-
ments were respectively endowed with the power to compel action and 
compliance by the sovereign people. 
Under the structural setup, government was required to act within its 
delegated power.193 Such delimitation of power was crucial to the 
two-tiered protection provided by the co-existing national and state 
trusts: 
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the 
administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against 
by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the 
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first 
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each 
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. 194 
The state and national governments were duty-bound to the people, who 
could be considered the settlor of the state and national trusts. 195 For 
190. FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 189, at 292-93. 
191. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 25. 
192. Doemberg points to judicial review as an additional source of governmental 
accountability. Doemberg, supra note 166, at 67 
193. As described by Akhil Amar, "government entities were sovereign only in a 
limited and derivative sense, exercising authority only within the boundaries set by the 
sovereign People." Amar, supra note 173, at 1436. 
194. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 , at 350-51 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
195. By extrapolating from the trust framework of governance, one sees that the 
people of the individual states functioned as settlor of the state trust, whereas the states, 
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this reason, Founders such as Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John 
Marshall, and James Iredell, considered governments as sovereign only 
within the sphere of their delegated power.196 
A. The States as Secondary Beneficiaries of the National Trust: 
Protection Against the Risks of Aggregating Sovereignty 
Under the trust framework, the states' role was not limited to serving 
as trustee of their respective citizenries and as settlor of the trust 
between the people of the nation and the national government. The 
states played an additional, important role in the American system of 
governance, serving as secondary beneficiary of the federal government's 
trusteeship under the national trust. It is useful to think of the national 
trust as a trust formed among the people of the states. 197 As discussed 
earlier, the people of the nation served in the role of primary beneficiary 
of the national trust. The national government owed a fiduciary duty to 
the people, and by virtue of this cardinal responsibility, assumed an 
ancillary duty to the states. The ancillary duty, embodied in the 
Guarantee Clause and Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, functioned 
to ensure that national policy could not completely subsume the interests 
of the people of the individual states. More specifically, the federal duty 
to the states could be described as a duty not to act outside delegated 
powers without the consent of the People, or alternatively, a duty to 
protect states powerless to protect themselves against plenary power.198 
196. Amar, supra note 173, at 1437. "Just as a corporation could be delegated 
limited sovereign privileges by the King-in-Parliament, so governments could be 
delegated limited powers to govern. Within the limitations of their charters, govern-
ments could be sovereign, but that sovereignty could be bounded by the terms of the 
delegation itself." Id. at 1435 (citation omitted). 
197. Recall that Locke believed that government derived from a "contract among 
people rather than between rulers and ruled." Doernberg, supra note 166, at 67. The 
idea of a trust formed among and between states contrasts with the state sovereignty 
theory, which views the Constitution as a contract among and between the states and, 
accordingly, treats the states as free to renounce and withdraw from the contract. The 
trust theory does not endorse this implication of the state sovereignty theory, but rather, 
views the Constitution as manifesting the aggregation of sovereignty. As such, the 
primary focus of the trust theory is on the national duties to which the formation of the 
trust among and between the people of the states gave rise. See Walter Berns, The 
Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in NATION OF STATES 139 (R. Goldwin 2d ed. 1973) 
(discussing the implications of the state sovereignty theory). 
I 98. Such consent could be expressed through a constitutional amendment, or 
alternatively, through a constitutional moment. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
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The sovereign people of the individual states granted power to the 
national government to maximize their own welfare. Aggregation of 
individual sovereignty could only have been achieved by a feeling that 
gains of aggregation would outweigh losses. 199 By aggregating 
collective sovereignty at the national level, the people reconstituted 
sovereignty that was previously concentrated in the people at the state 
level.200 Yet national power was to operate in tandem with the power 
reserved by the people at the state level. To think as a common, 
sovereign people, the people at the more localized levels of the states 
needed assurance that their interests would not be stampeded by other 
states wielding majority power through the national government. Thus, 
the structural design of government needed to limit opportunities for 
national overreaching---that is, opportunities to eat away at the power 
reserved for the individual states and, accordingly, the rights reserved for 
their citizens. 
B. The Federal Governments Duty Not to Destroy: The Structural 
Importance of States to American Governance 
The grant of plenary power over particular matters to the federal 
government relies on the premise of states functioning as the secondary 
beneficiaries of the national trust. The Antifederalists recognized that in 
a country this vast, states could protect local interests from despotism at 
the national level. . The single legislature was incapable of adequately 
representing such diverse interests.201 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (I 991 ). 
199. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (I 965) (describing the rent-seeking and free-riding 
interests that dominate collective action). 
200. States' rightists and nationalists disagreed as to whether sovereignty was 
concentrated principally in the people of the states or the people of the nation. Whereas 
the states ' rightists viewed the Constitution as a compact among the sovereign peoples 
of the individual states, the nationalists saw the Constitution as "a supreme statute 
deriving from the supreme sovereign legislature-the People of the nation." Amar, 
supra note 173, at 1452. I argue that regardless of whether one takes a states' rightists' 
or nationalists' view, protection of the bounded sovereignty retained by the states-the 
building blocks of the nation-was central to the Constitution. Under either view, the 
redefinition of the sovereignty structure could only be achieved with the acquiescence 
of the people themselves and the assurance that in exchange for sacrifices made on 
behalf of the nation, the individual states would retain some ability to resist encroach-
ment by the rest of the country. 
201. WOOD, supra note 174, at 527 (citation omitted). For a discussion of 
colonists ' perceptions of the unrepresentative British assembly ruling over the states, see 
Amar supra note 173, at 1445. Arguably, such perceptions gave rise to suspicion and 
skepticism of power removed from local levels. The Articles of Confederation represent 
one such manifestation of colonists' skepticism. 
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The experience with British rule left the colonists with this indelible 
anti-imperialist sentiment, but complete decentralization was not the 
solution, either. What was needed was an intermediate form of authority 
structure. As described by Akhil Amar, the Constitution's solution then 
represented "a harmonious Newtonian solar system in which individual 
states were preserved as distinct spheres, each with its own mass and 
pull, maintained in their proper orbit by the gravitational force of a 
common central body."202 Without a national duty to protect the 
states, the national government's gravitational force threatened to drag 
the states into it. 
Moreover, the states' role as beneficiary of the trust was critical to the 
envisioned scheme of government, because state power created "a double 
security . . . as to the rights of the people. The different governments 
control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by 
itself."203 States needed credible means of exercising power against 
overreaching by the federal government: Without a zone of autonomy 
from the federal government's reins, the states would not possess 
sufficient power and independence to serve the double security 
function.204 As such, the national government was to exercise power 
over "certain enumerated objects only . . . leav[ing] to the several States 
202. Amar, supra note 173, at 1449 (citation omitted). 
203. Bums, supra note 165, at 46 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See Madison's discussion of aggrandization of 
power in the context of separation of powers: "(T]he great security against a gradual 
concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those 
who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives 
to resist encroachments of the others . . . . Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 , at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. , 
1961). 
204. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of states as "a check on the 
abuses of government power" as well as counterbalancing the national government in 
order to protect "our fundamental liberties." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 









The People of Individual 







(acting as agents (endowed 
of the ·citizens of with plenary 































[VOL. 33: 755, 1996) Trusts Betrayed 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects."205 Of 
course, the states' zone of autonomy has never been of fixed scope. 
History has shown that the zone may contract when there is a growth of 
federal power.206 Thus, the federal government's duty to the secondary 
beneficiaries of the states implies that the expansion of federal power 
into such zones carries responsibilities with it. In particular, if the 
national government took actions that removed state control over specific 
issues, the national government assumed a duty to act as a fiduciary, 
ensuring in good faith that the power shift did not decrease the welfare 
of the states. 
VII. EXPRESSION OF THE TRUST: THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AND 
THE TENTH AMENDMENT 
A. Origins of Powers and Duties 
The Constitution represents the expression of the trust between the 
people of the nation and the federal government. The Constitution 
placed expansive powers in the federal government but also placed terms 
and restrictions on the exercise of such powers. Like the powers granted 
to any trustee, the Constitution entrusted the national government to act 
for the betterment of the people, the primary beneficiaries of the trust. 
For one, the Constitution granted Congress the power to tax, which is a 
concurrent state power not subject to federal preemption.207 Notably, 
205. Burns, supra note 165, at 45 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Hamilton's discussion of the relative powers of 
state and federal governments gives further support to the argument that a sphere of 
autonomy was reserved to the states: 
It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the 
national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the 
State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree 
of influence which the State governments, if they administer their affairs with 
uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people[, the 
beneficiaries of the states' trusteeship. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton). 
206. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 198, at 47-48 (discussing the constitutional 
moment of the New Deal and the change in the nature of federal power). 
207. But see ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 
REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 30 (1984) 
[hereinafter INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS]. 
Like the commerce power, the use of the taxing power as a regulatory device 
has worked most frequently to preempt state activity . . . . However, clear 
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concurrent powers extended far beyond taxation, encompassing specific 
powers granted to Congress but not denied to the states, such as the 
power to regulate commerce and the power to spend. The Supremacy 
Clause,208 and the powers that ensue from it, empowered the federal 
government to nullify state laws in conflict with federal law, and thereby 
regulate and preempt state activity.209 However, the Supremacy Clause 
only applies to federal laws that comport with the other provisions of the 
Constitution. 
Federal action must not contravene constitutional mandate. The 
Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment state that the exercise of 
plenary power by the federal government faces restrictions. In this 
capacity, the Guarantee Clause, together with the Tenth Amendment, is 
an expression of the subsidiary trust between the states and the federal 
government-tantamount to a statement that the states stand as the 
secondary beneficiaries of the federal government's trusteeship, protected 
against federal destruction. The Guarantee Clause states "that [t]he 
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government."210 Most scholars agree that Republican 
Government is a government in which the rulers are controlled by the 
people--"a government based on popular control."211 But only when 
the people have the ability to shape and direct their respective state 
governments is it possible for a republican government to exist.212 
Deborah Jones Merritt, a scholar who argues that the Guarantee Clause 
is a shield for state autonomy, summarizes the dual charges of the 
clause. She states that the clause prohibits the states from adopting 
nonrepublican forms of government, and so long as the states comply, 
manipulation of tax policy has also been used to "induce" state performance 
of certain functions. In fact, the now familiar inducement versus coercion 
standard "first evolved in cases challenging conditions attached to credits 
against federal taxes awarded to encourage state development of a particular 
program." 
Id. (quoting Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 
79 COL. L. REV. 858, 883 (1979)). 
208. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause specifically states: "This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land . . . . " Id. 
209. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 33, at 24; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 
supra note 207, at 25. 
210. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4. 
211. Deborah Jones Merritt, Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 23-25, N. 126 (1988) (citing J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 149 
(C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 252 (J. Madison) (J. 
Cooke Ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke Ed. 
1961). 
212. Merritt, supra note 211, at 25. 
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prohibits the federal government from taking actions that would destroy 
the states' republican character.21 3 These two dimensions of the 
Guarantee Clause reinforce each other, ensuring that republican 
government is protected. So long as the states promote and preserve 
republican governance, the Guarantee Clause entitles them to protection 
against federal intrusion.214 This interpretation of the Guarantee 
Clause is supported by the history of the founding2 15 and has been 
echoed by the federal courts in numerous, prominent cases of the past 
century.216 In other words, the Guarantee Clause pronounced that the 
federal government was affirmatively duty-bound by the national trust 
to protect qualifying state beneficiaries. 
The Tenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,"217 
bolsters the force of the Guarantee Clause as an expression of the states' 
role as secondary beneficiaries of the national trust. Although the Tenth 
Amendment has generally been found to "state[] but a truism that all is 
retained which has not been surrendered,"21 8 it is, nonetheless, impor-
213 . Id. (tracing the history and meaning of the Guarantee Clause). 
214. Note that the Guarantee Clause interpretation discussed here does not 
indemnify states from federal preemption. As noted by Deborah Jones Merritt, "[a] 
republican government . .. need not exercise its authority over any particular substantive 
area . . . . The guarantee clause assures the states the right to maintain autonomous, 
republican governments. The [S]upremacy [C]lause, however, denies those governments 
the power to regulate any fields properly preempted by Congress." Id. at 59. 
215. Id. at 29-36. "[B]oth advocates and foes of the new Constitution recognized 
the[G)uarantee [C]lause as an attempt to mark the boundary between federal power and 
state sovereignty." Id. at 35. 
2 I 6. For example, the Sixth Circuit also made the very important statement that a 
Guarantee Clause challenge to EPA regulations directing states to enforce federal 
pollution standards "was neither frivolous nor irresponsible." Id. at 28 (citing Brown v. 
EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 838-40 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded/or consideration of 
mootness, 431 U.S. 99 (I 977)). The court made the sagacious statement that the 
disjunction between the power to spend and the power to tax would ravage popular 
accountability and "encourage few even casually acquainted with the writings of 
Montesquieu and the Federalist papers to assert that the states enjoyed a Republican 
Form of Government." Id. (quoting Brown, 521 F.2d at 840.) Accordingly, the court 
invalidated the offending regulations. Id. at 25-28. 
217. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
218. United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1940). But see New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (stating that the Tenth Amendment confirms 
that powers reserved by the states are protected by limits on the federal government's 
constitutional powers). 
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tant as a "declar[ ation] of the relationship between the national and state 
governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the 
amendment."219 Moreover, the purpose of the Tenth Amendment was 
to "allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise 
powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise 
fully their reserved powers."220 
The Supreme Court has very visibly vacillated in its reading of the 
Tenth Amendment, oscillating between the interpretation that the 
Amendment places affirmative, justiciable limitations on federal 
displacement of state power and the interpretation that the Amendment 
is an inappropriate vehicle for challenging encroachments on sovereign-
ty. For example, in 1918, the Court's majority opinion in Hammer v. 
Dagenhari221 struck down a federal statute that excluded products of 
child labor from interstate commerce, in an attempt to eliminate child 
labor within the states. Justice Day, who wrote the majority opinion, 
stated: "In interpreting the Constitution it must never be forgotten that 
the Nation is made up of States, to which are entrusted the powers of 
local government. And to them and to the people the powers not 
expressly delegated to the National Government are reserved."222 
Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion, expressed his disagreement 
with the majority: "I should have thought that the most conspicuous 
decisions of this Court had made it clear that the power to regulate 
commerce and other constitutional powers could not be cut down or 
qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying out of the 
domestic policy of any State."223 Holmes was later vindicated by the 
Court's holding in United States v. Darby Lumber.224 In Darby 
Lumber, the Court upheld the federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 
which established a minimum wage for a forty-hour work week as well 
as overtime for some interstate activities. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Stone's opinion resonated with the principles expounded in 
Justice Holmes' Dagenhart dissent: "[T]he power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause is plenary to exclude any article from interstate 
commerce subject only to the specific prohibitions of the Constitu-
tion."225 
219. Darby Lumber, 312 U.S. at 124. 
220. Id. 
221. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
222. Id. at 275. 
223. Id. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
224. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
225. Id. at 116; see also Jennifer Smith, Judicial Review and Modern Federalism: 
Canada and the United States, in ROLE OF THE STATE, supra note 150, at 118-19 
(discussing the shift in reasoning by the majority in Darby and Dagenhart) . 
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More than a quarter century after Darby Lumber, the Supreme Court 
revisited the Tenth Amendment in National League of Cities v. 
Usery,226 and reversed the course of its long-standing jurisprudence. 
In National League, the Court recognized that the states needed judicial 
assistance in resisting federal usurpation of their powers and held that 
Congress could not impose federal minimum wage standards on state 
employees because it "would impair [their] ability to function effectively 
within a federal system" and destroy their "separate and independent 
existence. "227 In so holding, the Court also recognized a sphere of 
inviolable state powers. National League was not the end of the story, 
however. The decision was effectively overturned by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,228 which seemed to seal the 
fate of the Tenth Amendment by concluding that the Amendment was 
mere tautology and did not establish positive rights on behalf of the 
states. Garcia held that the Tenth Amendment did not immunize a city 
transit authority from the federal government's power to regulate 
workers' hours and wages. Justice Blackmun cited the difficulties of 
defining traditional state functions entitled to immunity from federal 
regulation, emphasizing that the Framers intended for the restraints on 
federal power to inhere in the daily functioning of the federal govem-
ment.229 Thus, procedural limitations of the federal system of govern-
ment were more appropriate for resolving disputes than judicially created 
restrictions on federal power.230 Thus, with Garcia, Americans saw 
arguments for judicial safeguards for federalism give way to arguments 
based on faith in the political process. 
Many thought Garcia marked the death of federalism, but the recent 
case of New York v. United States,231 gave reason to believe that the 
Court was willing to recognize federalism as a substantive constitutional 
principle. In New York, the Supreme Court held that the Tenth 
Amendment protects the sovereignty reserved to states by prohibiting 
congressional commandeering of state's legislative processes "by directly 
226. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
227. Id. at 851-52. 
228. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
229. Id. at 554; see discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
230. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554. 
231. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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compel~ing them to enact a federal regulatory program. "232 Pursuant 
to this holding, the Court struck down a portion of the federal Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which required states unable to 
provide for disposal of waste to take title to the waste. Yet the potential 
implications of New York were minimized by the Court's concession that 
Congress could have had the power to preempt state radioactive waste 
regulation.233 In the end, New York was another swing of the pendu-
lum that continued the pattern of oscillation that had been set decades 
earlier. 
Some have interpreted the Court's mercurial position as trivializing, 
and even subverting, any strength or significance one might attach to the 
Tenth Amendment. However, the fact that the Court has not taken the 
hard-and-fast line that the Tenth Amendment constitutionally limits 
congressional power to displace certain state functions does not 
undermine the contention that the Tenth Amendment, coupled with the 
Guarantee Clause, gives rise to federal duties to states. Rather, the 
Court's vacillation reflects the difficulty of enforcing the national 
government's duty as trustee to the states, and should be interpreted as 
a call for workable principles of federal-state relations. 
B. Reconciling the Dual Sovereignty and the Sovereign People 
Paradigms 
Traditionally, the relationship between state government, federal 
government, the people of the states, and the people of the nation has 
been classified under one of two paradigms: The people as sovereign 
or dual sovereignty. Dual sovereignty between the states and federal 
government places all powers of sovereignty, except those explicitly 
granted to the federal government, in the state governments.234 The 
notion of dual sovereignty has animated some of the most important 
discussions of American federalism of the past century, including Justice 
O'Connor's recent majority opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft, which held 
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not invalidate the 
Missouri Constitution's mandatory retirement provision, as applied to 
state judges.235 Underscoring the importance of states to democratic 
232. Id. at 176 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
233. Id. at 160. 
234. See RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS ' DESIGN 30-75 (1987). 
235. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). The mandatory retirement provision of the Missouri 
Constitution being challenged stood in apparent conflict to the Federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act (ADEA), which made it illegal for employers to discharge 
workers over 40 on the basis of age. The Court held that before the ADEA could be 
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governance, O'Connor described the basic precepts of our Constitional 
system of dual sovereignty:236 
'[T]he people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and 
endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence,' 
... ' [W]ithout the States in union there could be no political body as the 
United States.' Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and 
independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, 
but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the 
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of 
the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the 
National government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.237 
The dual sovereignty paradigm described by O'Connor and others stands 
in contrast to the concept that sovereignty resides in the people of the 
nation.238 Whereas the crux of the dual sovereignty paradigm lies in 
preservation of inviolable state power to counteract federal power, the 
basic tenet of the sovereign people paradigm is maximization of the 
people's ability to exercise their sovereign rights (which may or may not 
be achievable through dual sovereignty.) 
The dual trusts model proposed by this Article finds false dichotomy 
between these two mainstream paradigms regarding the vestiture of 
power in the federal government. Instead of viewing state and federal 
government as either dual, independent sovereigns or as agents of a 
single, omnipotent sovereign (the people), the trusts model accommo-
dates both views. Under the trusts model, the power of the state and 
federal governments, which is usually referred to as the power of the 
sovereign by the dual sovereignty paradigm, would be described as the 
power of a trustee, limited by the terms of the trust relationship. Also, 
in contrast to the notion that the people of the nation act as a single 
sovereign to control the federal government, the trusts model envisions 
federal government as the agent of the sovereign people of the nation, 
but also duty-bound to the states. The federal government serves as 
agent of the sovereign people of the states ( subgroups of the larger 
sovereign) through its relationship with state governments. 
applied to the forced retirement of state judges, Congress had to make a "plain 
statement" to that effect. Id. at 464. 
236. Id. at 457. 
237. Id. (citing Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), quoting Lane County v. 
Oregon, 7 Wall. 76 (1869)). 
238. See discussion supra parts V.D. to VI.A. 
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In accordance with the Founders' views of sovereignty and gover-
nance, academic discussions of federalism that center on the doctrine of 
dual sovereignty can be properly recast around the doctrine of dual 
trusteeship. With the growth of national power over areas of policy 
traditionally controlled by the states, the doctrine of dual sovereignty 
began to languish as a conceptual tool for analyzing problems of 
federalism.239 As New Deal programs empowered Congress to act in 
most areas of economic and social concern and simultaneously 
diminished powers that had formerly belonged in the exclusive sphere 
of the states, the doctrine of dual sovereignty became moribund.240 
The dual trusts model is capable of resisting such an unfortunate fate 
because it allows for shifts in the relative powers of state and federal 
governments if the sovereign people have mandated the shift.241 Yet, 
in the event of a shift, the federal government, in the capacity of trustee, 
would assume an affirmative, fiduciary duty to protect states 
disempowered to act on their own behalf. 
VIII. REFINING THE TRUSTS MODEL OF GOVERNANCE: 
INSTRUCTIVE FORERUNNERS 
Having presented the merits of the trust model as a conceptual tool, 
the question remains: What federal responsibilities does the trust 
relationship impose with respect to states fiscally affected by illegal 
immigration? Moving away from the abstract, theoretical contours of 
the trust paradigm, to an analysis of the federal duties owed to states that 
pick up the tab for federally designed and engineered immigration 
programs, this Article looks for guidance and extrapolates from other 
areas of public law where the trust doctrine has been invoked. 
The notion of federal trust is not new. It has been applied in the 
context of federal Indian law, coastal management, and international law 
applicable to the relationship between the United States and its 
commonwealths and territories.242 The existence of a legally enforce-
able trust underlies the application of the trust doctrine in many of these 
analogous contexts. Of the prototypes, federal Indian law and interna-
tional law are especially instructive because they demonstrate a trustee's 
duties to beneficiaries with sovereign qualities. For each of the 
illustrative prototypes, the Article probes to find the underlying purpose 
239. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 153, at 5-10. 
240. Id. 
241. Such a mandate might take the fonn of a constitutional amendment, or more 
probably, a constitutional moment, such as the New Deal. 
242. See discussion infra notes 243-291 and accompanying text. 
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of the trusteeship and its rules of interpretation. The analogies presented 
here provide insight as well as some precedence for conceiving the state 
and national governments as trustees with decisionmaking power over 
fiscal resources for the benefit of the people of the nation and the states. 
A. Land Use 
1. The Public Trust Doctrine 
The "public trust" is the specific label placed on states' special titles 
to coastal waters, the lands beneath, and the living resources inhabiting 
the waters.243 According to the public trust doctrine, these special 
titles are held by states in trust for the benefit of the public and establish 
the public's right to make use of the trust waters, underlying lands, 
tidelands, and resources for recognized public uses.244 The doctrine's 
intended purpose was to function as a "proscriptive statement on the 
limits of sovereign authority."245 The public trust doctrine is an 
ancient property law principle which derived from English common law 
heritage and now exists in every U.S. state.246 The common law 
heritage of the public trust doctrine has enabled it to adapt to changing 
social conditions while maintaining its central character of assuring the 
public's continued benefit from waterways.247 It is believed that the 
doctrine's flexibility will ensure its continued applicability and surviv-
al.24s 
243. DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK xvi 
(1990); see also JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE 
MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA'S COASTS 5 (1994). 
244. Id. 
245. Randal David Orton, Inventing the Public Trust Doctrine: California Water 
Lake and the Mono Lake Controversy 25 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Cal. (Los Angeles)). 
246. Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (holding that the 
public trust doctrine applies in every state to all tidal waters); see also ARCHER, supra 
note 243, at 4. 
247. ARCHER, supra note 243, at 4-5. 
248. SLADE, supra note 243, at xxi. 
The Public Trust Doctrine has evolved from preserving the public's rights to 
use trust lands and waters for commerce, navigation and fishing, to protecting 
modem uses that are "related to the natural uses peculiar to that resource." 
This dynamic nature, firmly documented by the courts over the centuries and 
fundamental to the application of the doctrine, has enabled it to persist for over 
1,500 years. 
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The public trust doctrine vests authority in states by virtue of their 
control over state property. Pursuant to the doctrine, states have the 
power to govern and manage land, water, and living resources that fall 
within the scope of the doctrine as their own property.249 States 
properly exercising public trust power are not susceptible to takings 
challenges because they are considered to be exercising authority over 
their own property, not the property of private individuals.250 Similar-
ly, the national government, exercising trust authority over national fiscal 
and other resources, is viewed as exercising power over resources 
belonging to it. Yet, in both these cases, the government "ownership" 
is subject to a trust for the benefit of the public subject to certain rights 
of usage. 
2. Limitations Imposed by Jus Publicum and Jus Privatum 
Grants of public trust lands to private owners are subject to the public 
trust and to the state's duty to "protect the ~ublic interest from any use 
that would substantially impair the trust." 51 Consequently, the state 
trust of coastal areas is a hybrid, divided into two forms of titles: }us 
publicum (the public's trust title) andjus privatum (a private proprietary 
title). The }us privatum is the title to the transferable property held by 
the government in the use and possession of trust lands. The }us 
privatum may be conveyed into private ownership, but the conveyance 
will be conditioned. That is, thejus privatum will always be subservient 
to the dominantjus publicum, the collective public right to use and enjoy 
public trust lands, waters, and their resources for particular traditional 
purposes, such as navigation and fishing.252 Thus, the use of public 
trust land held in }us privatum will always be restricted by the }us publi-
cum.253 Under English common law, conflicts between the exercise of 
Id. (citation omitted). 
249. Id. at xxiii (positing that a state governing and managing public lands as its 
own property "is in sharp contrast to a State regulating a citizen's private property 
through its police powers"). 
250. id. 
251. ARCHER, supra note 243, at 4. 
252. id. at 6-11 ; see also SLADE, supra note 243, at 176 (nearly one-third of trust 
land in the United States is privately owned). 
253. Illinois Cen. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455 (1892). 
Id. 
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The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be 
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has 
an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property . . . . Any 
grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by 
which the property was held by the State can be resumed at any time. 
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private and public rights in public trust lands and waters were decided 
in favor of the public.254 
The bifurcated ownership interests that arise when the }us privatum is 
conveyed into private ownership spawn tension between public and 
private rights because individual rights in conveyances that have been 
made for purely private, non-water dependent, or related purposes 
conflict with common rights of usage in those lands.255 Both the 
English common law and its American progeny have given some 
resolution to the problem by establishing mechanisms that operate ex 
ante to regulate the state's conveyance of the jus privatum of trust lands 
to private ownership. To validly convey the }us privatum to private 
ownership, the state must authorize the conveyance through legislation, 
which must describe the conveyance in clear and definite language, and 
all ambiguities must be construed in favor of the state and against the 
private party.256 The conveyance must primarily serve the public 
interest and benefits to private parties must be subsidiary, and must not 
substantially impair the public interest in the remaining land or 
water.257 Non-compliance with any of these requirements constitutes 
violation of the public trust doctrine, and may void the conveyance. 
This is because states lack the authority to "abdicate [their] trust over 
property in which the whole people are interested."258 
One can view the tension between private and public interests arising 
under the }us privatum as analogous to the tension between national 
( aggregated) and state ( disaggregated) interests regarding accountability 
and control for illegal immigration matters. Limitations placed on the 
conveyance of the }us privatum are generally instructive of the state 
trustee's inalienable, affirmative duty to maintain and protect the corpus 
254. SLADE, supra note 243, at 180. 
255. ARCHER, supra note 243, at 9; see Illinois Cen. R.R. 146 U.S. 387. 
256. State legislatures may delegate the authority to trust lands to a state agency. 
SLADE, supra note 243, at 177. 
257. Id. at 178. With respect to impairment, Slade notes: 
On occasion courts have recognized that some impairment of the trust resource 
of the public's trust rights therein is unavoidable, even though the degree of 
impairment may not be substantial. In such cases, some courts have noted the 
states' "duty as trustee to consider the effect of taking on the public trust, and 
to preserve, so far as consistent with the public interest, the uses protected by 
the trust". 
Id. at 179 (quoting National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 658 P.2d 709, 728, 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983)). 
258. Illinois Cen. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 ; see also SLADE, supra note 243, at 179. 
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of the trust.259 Applied to federal duties regarding immigration 
matters, the public trust doctrine militates in favor of a clear standard of 
federal performance when the federal government assumes trustee duties 
by preempting state power to legislate and assumes responsibility for 
reallocating resources. The public trust doctrine implies that the state 
has heightened responsibility for its decisionmaking in a trustee capacity. 
Moreover, the public trust doctrine underscores the fact that reallocation 
by the trustee must primarily further the interests of the primary 
beneficiaries (the people) and secondary beneficiaries (the states) and 
that reallocation must take place in such a way that the beneficiaries are 
able to discern it. Yet it should be noted that although the public trust 
doctrine sheds some insight on duties of trustees, it is distinguished from 
the dual trust paradigm by the fact that the beneficiaries are not 
themselves entities protecting sovereign interests of some subgroup. 
Other federal trust examples, as in the Indian context, provide further 
insight on the rights of states' interests affected by the loss of resources 
as a result of an allocation decision made by the federal government as 
trustee. 
B. Indian Trusts 
1. The Nature of Governmental-Trustee Duties 
The United States government has a fiduciary, trustee relationship with 
Indian tribes and their trust property.260 That is, it has agreed to act 
in good faith to promote the best interest of the Indians. Like the 
national trust paradigm put forth in this Article, the Indian trust is 
distinct from most other forms of trusts, such as private trusts, because 
"strict trust law cannot fully accommodate the sovereign nature of both 
the trustee and the Indian tribal beneficiary."261 Commentators have 
259. However, some believe that the public trust doctrine is "little more than a 
sham-a mask for the unauthorized substitution of judicial for administrative discretion." 
Orton, supra note 245, at 22. Under such a view, the public trust doctrine provides 
cannot provide much guidance for reifying other trust paradigms, such as the national 
trust paradigm proposed in this Article. 
260. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46-47 (1913). 
261. GILBERT L. HALL, INSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAW, DUTY 
OF PROTECTION: THE FEDERAL INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP 2 (I 979). I do not wish 
to overstate the similarity between the Indian tribes and the states. The sovereign nature 
of states may be distinguished from the sovereign nature of Indian tribes. As noted by 
Judith Resnick, 
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differences between the two "sovereigns." At least in theory, states have 
entered into a compact, called the United States Constitution, and willfully 
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offered a few, slightly contrasting descriptions of the federal trust 
responsibility to Indians. For example, the Department of Interior 
describes the crux of the federal trust duty as an obligation to protect 
"valuable Indian lands, water minerals, and other natural resources."262 
The American Indian Policy Review Commission describes the trust duty 
as an obligation to safeguard and promote Indian self-government and 
economic independence by providing Indians with social and economic 
resources that would raise their standard of living to a level commensu-
rate with their non-Indian neighbors.263 Others view the trust responsi-
bility as a duty to provide an Indian aid program, which would facilitate 
restoration of their tribal economies and invigorate self-government.264 
All the descriptions of trust duties based on Indian treaties and 
agreements, judicial decisions, tribal statements, and congressional acts, 
point to a common purpose: "the continued survival of Indian tribes as 
self-governing peoples."265 From this purpose ensues the duty to 
protect, not control, Indians in the defense of their groperty and rights, 
as well as the duty to provide certain services.2 The beneficiary 
arrangement is parallel to the arrangement under the national trust. Just 
their representatives in Congress in the decisions of the national government. 
Such claims cannot be made, even in theory, for the Indian tribes, whose 
representatives neither signed the Constitution nor sit in Congress. 
Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 , 680 (1989). 
262. HALL, supra note 261, at 2 (quoting Oversight Hearings on BIA Management 
Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs (Aug. I, 1977) (statement of Under 
Secretary James A. Joseph, Dept. of the Interior)). 
263. Id. at 2. Hall cites The American Indian Policy Review Commission, which 
described the trust responsibility as 
Id. 
an established legal obligation which requires the United States to protect and 
enhance Indian trust resources and tribal self-government and to provide 
economic and social programs necessary to raise the standard of living and 
social well-being of the Indian people to a level comparable to the non-Indian 
society. 
264. Id. at 2-3; see also Larry B. Leventhal, American Indians-the Trust 
Responsibility: An Overview, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 625 (1985) (presenting an overarching 
analysis of the federal trust responsibility to Indians). 
265. HALL, supra note 261 , at 3. "Protection is the key word used in the definition 
of the trust responsibility: protection of Indians, their property and rights by the United 
States government". Id. The three broad areas of federal trust responsibilities for 
Indians are: "I. protection oflndian trust property, 2. Protection of the Indian right to 
self-government [and] 3. Provision of those social, medical and educational services 
necessary for survival of the tribe." Id. at 9. 
266. Id. at 3. 
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as the people of the nation are the primary beneficiaries and the states 
and their citizens are the secondary beneficiaries under the national trust, 
individual Indians are the primary beneficiaries and the tribes, through 
which the individuals receive benefits, are the secondary beneficiaries 
under the Indian trust.267 
2. Evincing the Trust: Treaties 
Treaties and agreements, the United States Constitution, judicial 
decisions, and federal statutes all serve as sources for the government's 
trust responsibility to Indians. An example of trust responsibilities 
assumed under treaties includes the U.S. treaty with the Kaskaskias 
Indians. This treaty stated, "the United States will take the Kaskaskias 
tribe under their immediate care and patronage, and will afford them a 
protection as effectual against the other Indian tribes and against all 
other persons whatever as it is enjoyed by their own citizens. "268 
Constitutional powers and duties regarding Indians originate from the 
Commerce Clause, the power to make treaties, the power to negotiate for 
conditions of peace, the power to rirovide for the general welfare, and 
the power over federal territories. 69 As pertains to federal relations 
with Indians, the treaty-making power as well as the commerce power, 
have been interpreted by many courts to be as much a limitation on 
federal power as a grant of broad authority.27° Federal statutes fortify 
the federal government's duties to the Indians. As recognized by the 
Court of Appeals in Seneca Nation v. United States, legislation such as 
the Trade and Intercourse Acts establishes a "special relationship 
267. Id. at 12. 
268. Id. at 4 (quoting Treaty with the Kaskaskias, August 13, 1803, art. 2, 7 Stat. 
78). "[T]he 'undersigned Kings, Chiefs, and Warriors, for themselves and all parts of 
the Creek Nation within the limits of the United States, do acknowledge themselves, and 
the said parts of the Creek Nation, to be under the protection of the United States."' Id. 
(quoting Treaty of August 7, 1790 with the Creek Nation, art. 2, 7 Stat. 35). 
The contracting parties agree that the laws now in force, and such others as 
may be passed, regulating the trade and intercourse, and for the preservation 
of peace with the various tribes of Indians under the protection and guardian-
ship of the Government of the United States, shall be as binding and obligatory 
upon the said Utah as if said laws had been enacted for their sole benefit and 
protection. 
Id. (quoting Treaty with the Utah of 1849, art. IV, CHARLES KAPPLER, KAPPLER'S 
INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES, Vol. II, 8-10 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. 
Printing Office, 1904)). 
269. Id. at 5. 
270. Id.; see United States v. Kagama, I 18 U.S. 375 (1886); McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973). 
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between the Federal Government and those Indians covered by the 
legislation. "271 
3. Interpretation and Enforcement of Trustee Obligations: The Role 
of the Judiciary 
a. Fiduciary Obligations and Rules of Interpretation 
Judicial decisions are a very important source of pronouncements 
regarding federal trust duties to Indians. Generally, decisions will 
consider the sum of treaties, legislation, and the history of arrangements 
between the United States Government and Indians. In response to the 
unequal bargaining power between the tribal beneficiaries and the 
government trustee in treaty negotiations, the United States Supreme 
Court has developed rules for interpreting the meaning of treaties and 
federal laws pertaining to Indians.272 Under such rules of interpreta-
tion, federal courts will use heightened scrutiny when interpreting Indian 
treaties as compared to other international treaties. Furthermore, such 
rules of interpretation compel courts and federal agencies to act in 
benefit of Indian rights, when they may not have done so otherwise.273 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia274 is the first case to imply the trust 
duties of the federal government to Indians. Cherokee Nation reasoned 
that the relationship between Indians and the United States "resembles 
that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for 
protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief of 
their wants. "275 The Court viewed the trust relationship as a source of 
271. 173 Ct. Cl. 917, 925 (1965). 
272. HALL, supra note 261, at 5. For a list of federal cases defining and applying 
these rules, see Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian 
Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth "-How 
Long a Time ls That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 607 (1975); and Reid Peyton Chambers, 
Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians , 27 STAN. L. REV. 
1213, 1214-15 (1975). 
273. HALL, supra note 261, at 5; see also Chambers, supra note 272 (discussing the 
development of the Indian trust doctrine through federal common law adjudication). 
274. 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
275. Id. at 17; see also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (describing 
Indian tribes as "wards of the nation . .. dependent on the United States . . . . From 
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the 
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there 
arises the dttty of protection, and with it the power"). 
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federal responsibility as well as a source of federal power.276 The 
Court narrowed decisions which seemed to legitimize the broad exercise 
of federal plenary power over lndians277 by finding that positive duties 
arose from plenary trustee power.278 
Numerous cases illustrate the Court's view of federal duties. In United 
States v. Creek Nation, the Supreme Court found that constitutional 
provisions restricted the plenary trust power, and held that the United 
States could not expropriate Indian land without providing 'Just 
compensation for them; for that 'would not be an exercise of guardian-
ship, but an act of confiscation. "'279 Similarly, in Seminole Nation v. 
United States, the Court invoked equitable considerations to rule in favor 
of the Seminole Indians who were suing the United States for failure to 
observe particular treaties, agreements, and statutes.280 As stated by 
the Court, the United States' obligations of trusteeship made it more than 
a mere contracting party.281 The Court went on to emphasize the high 
standard to which the government should hold itself: As trustee, the 
government is subject to the most exacting :fiduciary standards in its 
dealings with the Indians.282 
The United States' fiduciary obligation under the Indian trust was also 
relied upon by the Court of Claims when it found that the United States 
had the duty to properly manage Indian money under its trusteeship. 
Thus, the court held that the United States was liable for failing to 
276. See Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (upholding the application of the 1885 Indian 
Appropriation Act - federal criminal law - to Indian country on the basis of the 
guardian-ward relationship); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding 
federal action in violation of the terms of the I 867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge on the 
grounds that the federal government possessed plenary power over Indian affairs). 
277. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553; see also William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of 
Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1987) (describing the broad 
power of Congress to define the parameters of Indian sovereignty). 
278. But see Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) (stating that the 
"Government cannot follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary" when the 
Executive branch is faced with congressionally-imposed duties inconsistent with the 
protection of Indian resources). 
279. 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935)(citation omitted). The Court further explained: 
The tribe was a dependent Indian community under the guardianship of the 
United States, and therefore its property and affairs were subject to the control 
and management of that government. But this power to control and manage 
was not absolute. While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting 
and advancing the tribe, it was subject to limitations inhering in such 
guardianship and to pertinent consitutional restrictions. 
Id. at I 09-1 0; see also Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment 
Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the "Sioux Nation" Rule, 61 OR. L. REV. 245 
(1982). 
280. 316 U.S. 286, 295 (1942). 
281. Id. at 296. 
282. Id. at 297. 
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deposit Indian funds in the Menominee Log Fund, a Treasury account 
which carried a higher interest rate than other Treasury accounts.283 
A district court affirmed this principle more than 25 years later, holding 
that, by virtue of its ''unquestioned . . . trust obligation to the Indian 
people," it had a duty to invest Indian trust funds in accounts that 
produced income.284 
b. Extrapolating from the Jurisprudence of Indian Trusts 
Immigration legislation, such as !RCA, which involves an element of 
bargaining between states and the federal government for the exchange 
of cost-imposing immigration measures and federal assistance, shares 
characteristics with treaties between Indians and the United States. 
Although such legislation is not technically a formal agreement between 
the federal government and the states, as a treaty would be, the exchange 
of obligations and the creation of accompanying rights between states 
and the federal government resembles the promises enshrined in most 
Indian treaties. In both situations the United States Government 
negotiates and -bargains with entities that have sovereign, self-governing 
qualities. The Supreme Court has recognized the sovereign nature of 
Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" which existed as "distinct 
political societ[ies] ... capable of managing [their] own affairs and 
governing [themselves]."285 This status of the Indian tribes is analo-
gous to the states of the Union.286 Thus, drawing from the example 
of the Indian Trust, rules of interpretation applied to immigration 
legislation should favor states when it is apparent that they possessed 
283. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 59 F.Supp. 137, 141 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (In the 
capacity of trustee, the United States is "under the obligation to use funds in its hands 
in the way most beneficial to plaintiff."). 
284. Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 
I 243 (N.D. Cal. I 973). The Court concluded that trust duties include the duty to use 
"reasonable care and skill to make the trust property productive". Id. at 1245. 
285. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 15, 16 (1831). 
286. Judith Resnick argues that the multiple court systems, including federal, state, 
and tribal courts, is dominated by the federal courts which possess enormous power yet 
continue to allow state and tribal courts to thrive. Resnick, supra note 261, at 740-59. 
Resnick contends that by exploring the relationship between federal courts and Indian 
tribes together with the history and treatment of Indian tribes, we can illuminate the 
relationship between state and federal systems, and come to better understand the role 
of "brute force" in constitutionalism. Id. 
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significantly less bargaining power than the federal government which 
enacted the legislation. 
C. An Excursus on American Commonwealths: The United States 
Relationship with its Associated States 
The relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico, a 
commonwealth in free association with the United States, and between 
the United States and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, parts of 
which are now in free association with the United States,287 is charac-
terized by power disparities and dependence. This situation calls to 
mind the situation facing states dependent on federal funds for programs 
and services related to illegal immigration. Both Puerto Rico and the 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands fall under the category of 
associated state, "an entity that has delegated certain competences ... 
to a principal state, although it retains its international status as a 
state."288 As described by Michael Reisman: 
Where two states of unequal power establish formal and durable links, we may 
speak of an "association". . . . A relationship of association in contemporary 
international law is characterized by recognition of the significant subordination 
of and delegations of competence by one of the parties (the associate) to the 
other (the principal) but maintenance of the continuing international status of 
statehood of each component. . . . Association involves a recognition of the 
political dependence of an entity, but at the same time an insistence on its 
continuing discrete identity under the international scrutiny accorded to all 
states.289 
As the principal in the association with Puerto Rico and the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands, the United States has taken on a 
fiduciary duty to its associates. 
The power relationship characterizing the U.S. associations is 
manifested in several ways. By virtue of its relationship with the United 
States, which is based on "a bilateral compact of association between the 
287. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is also known as Micronesia and 
consists of four entities: the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and Palau. In 1975, the Northern Marianas became a 
Commonwealth. The U.S. approved Compacts of Free Association with the Federated 
States of Micronesia and the Marshal Islands in 1983. Trusteeship Council Reviews 
Situation in Palau, UN CHRONICLE, Sept. 1991, at 38. Free association replaces 
trusteeship with some form of self-government, an arrangement characterized by neither 
pure independence nor pure supervision. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, PUERTO Rico AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW ROLES IN ASSOCIATION 10 (1975). 
288. Hurst Hannum & Richard B. Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International 
Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L. L. 858, 859 n.13 (1980). 
289. REISMAN, supra note 287, at 10, 19. 
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metropolitan state and its former colony,"290 Puerto Rico is not subject 
to federal income tax. Moreover, Puerto Rico benefits from the umbrella 
of U.S. protection, has free access to U.S. markets, and is favored by tax 
incentives to stimulate investment.291 In addition, Puerto Rico receives 
over $3.7 billion dollars in federal funds and federal guarantees for loans 
received by the Puerto Rican government. Puerto Ricans also have 
American citizenship, but they are not able to vote in federal elec-
tions---with representation limited to a non-voting resident commissioner 
on Capitol Hill. 
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is also subordinate to the 
United States in many of its activities. First and foremost, the United 
States retains military authority in exchange for American aid to the 
region.292 
Although the associated state relationship provides a vivid example of 
a dependency relationship that the U.S. federal government dominates, 
the courts, unfortunately, have not spoken on the United States' duty to 
its associated states. Thus, this area provides no real guidance as to 
what role the U.S. judiciary should take to remedy federal abdication of 
duties owed to beneficiaries of the federal trusteeship. Given the highly 
political nature of the associated state relationship, it is unlikely that the 
court will ever speak on the question of federal duties to associated 
states. Does a similar fate await the immigration states? The answer 
does not have to be "Yes." 
IX. TRUSTEESHIP AND ACCOUNTABILITY: LESSONS FOR THE 
COURTS 
Analysis of the federal government's Guarantee Clause and Tenth 
Amendment duties under the trust paradigm differs from traditional 
analyses because it imposes a higher standard of public review of the 
federal government's performance when the federal government assumes 
trustee duties by preempting state power to legislate and by taking 
responsibility for reallocating resources. 
290. Id. at XI. 
291. House Backs Puerto Rico Referendum, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., 
Oct. 26, I 990, at 795. 
292. Clyde Habennan, Micronesia Resents a Far Land Called Washington, N.Y . 
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1985, at A2. 
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Like a term in a contract, a promise to assist states in a particular 
manner in connection with a particular statutory scheme-----particularly 
when the scheme imposes hardship on select states----represents a 
bargained-for condition on which passage of a bill may turn. The Court 
has advanced compelling reasons for federal dominance, but the question 
of fiscal accountability remains. The Court has shown, as in the case of 
coastal waters and Indian tribes, that it can play a role in ensuring that 
the federal government does not disempower states without meeting the 
accompanying responsibilities that arise from such disempowerment. 
The federal government is the trustee of the national trust, and the 
executive branch is specifically responsible for executing policy that will 
impact the trust's beneficiaries. The Court should use strict rules of 
interpretation, as it has in Indian trust cases, when reviewing the actions 
of those administering laws .. Such rules should ensure that the executive 
branch acts vigorously and faithfully to carry out the national trusteeship 
for the states. Moreover, such rules should negate the federal impetus 
to delegate program costs to states. 
The great power that inheres in judicial review renders the Court a 
depository of significant political power. Thus, the decision to leave 
resolution to the political process is, in and of itself, a decision not to 
use the political power possessed by the Court. As discussed by Henry 
Monaghan: 
[The Court has a] power to fashion a substructure of implementing ' legislative' 
rules-rules that are admittedly not integral parts of the Constitution . . .. 
Since the states and federal government have apparently not taken steps to 
create a self-regulating regime, and since the Court is necessarily involved in 
the definition of the dimensions of the constitutional rights involved, there 
seems little reason for the Court not to prescribe rules sufficient to create self-
regulation. 293 
If the Court should continue to hold that state sovereign interests are 
better protected by the procedural safeguards built into the federal 
system of governance than by judge-made limitations on federal 
power,294 then the federal government must develop self-regulating 
guidelines and mechanisms that prevent and remedy failures in our 
system of federalism, which, if left uncorrected, threaten to undermine 
the intent of the Framers and our system of federal governance. The 
task is formidable, but the trusts model should be instructive. Legisla-
293. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Consitutiona/ Common Law, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. I, 23 (1975) (discussing the "utility of providing the police with guidance in the 
Miranda and lineup situations so that they may understand (and presumably follow) their 
duty with regard to individual liberties") (citations omitted). 
294. See discussion supra n.56 and accompanying text. 
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tion to prevent unfunded federal mandating is not an answer, because 
such legislation does not resolve the issue of backdoor unfunded 
mandating, which is central to the problem in the immigration area. The 
Court can and should play a role in umpiring federalism issues that arise 
in the context of backdoor unfunded immigration mandates. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The states' claims for reimbursement of immigration costs find no 
easy answers. Certainly, for the Court to find that the states have a 
cause of action under the Tenth Amendment or the Guarantee Clause for 
reimbursement of all costs incurred in association with illegal immigra-
tion, a radical new jurisprudence would be required. The Court is 
unlikely to go that far. However, partial federal nonfeasance, as in the 
instance of the Attorney General's failure to develop regulations 
necessary to disburse the "Immigration Emergency Fund" or failure to 
reimburse states for the costs of incarcerating illegal immigrants, lends 
itself to analysis under the trust paradigm and calls for rules of 
interpretation that should be inspired by jurisprudence from other areas 
of governmental trusteeship. Applying the trust paradigm provides 
greater guidance than other standards in analyzing the state claims for 
reimbursement, including questions as to whether conditions on federal 
funding are simply pressure (a valid exercise of the spending power) or 
coercion (an invalid exercise of the spending power).295 
The Constitution properly limited the states' power to act on their own 
behalf in the immigration sphere, but this constitutional mandate 
presupposed minimal structural protections inherent in the underlying 
trusteeship of the federal government--protections including fiscal 
accountability. As history has shown, federal plenary power over 
immigration has threatened and commandeered the autonomy and 
resources of immigration states. Congressional proposals to further limit 
immigrant access to federal benefits will impose future costs on states 
that have no choice but to ensure the welfare of their residents. 
Congress should think before it indirectly delegates program costs. In 
the event Congress fails to do so, the Court should step in, as it has in 
the past, and hold the federal government to its trusteeship duties. 
295. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987). 
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